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Abstract 
 
This research is designed to test the role reflecting on and sharing values plays in our 
individual decision-making schemas in a group. The research is based on evidence from 
the literature that values play a role in economic decision-making, can be formed and 
utilized either consciously or unconsciously, and impact microeconomic decision-making 
and ethics in organizations. The study found that when decision considerations were 
reframed in a values context the decision-making process became more quasi-rational, 
but the decisions participants made were as good or better than they were before values 
were introduced. In some cases decision-makers became less interested in personal 
considerations after decisions were framed in a values context. This is an important 
finding because traditional models of economic decision-making assume the decision-
making process is always rational and decision-makers are always self-interested. There 
may also be some relationship between utilizing values and improved ethical decision-
making for women within small groups with relatively strong relationships in a 
community. 
 Keywords: economic decision-making, schemas, values, values in decision-
making, organizational behavior. 
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An Exploratory Study of the Role of Values in Microeconomic Decision-Making and the 
Implications for Organizations and Leaders 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 Much of the traditional economic decision-making models that are still in use 
today are based on the assumptions of rational choice and self-interest. These 
assumptions create a fact/value dichotomy. However, there is evidence that while 
assumptions of rationality and self-interest are normative constructs, the way we actually 
make decisions incorporates both facts and values (Bell, 2011b; Binmore, 2007; Nelson, 
2003; Putnam, 2002). The purpose of this exploratory research is to test the role 
reflecting on and sharing values plays in our individual decision-making schemas in 
groups. Specifically, can introducing values into decision considerations disrupt existing 
unconscious schemas? Implications for microeconomic decision-making in organizations 
will also be considered. 
 
Research Questions 
 
 The framework of this exploratory study was based on the following research 
questions: 
 What role do values play in microeconomic and other decision-making? 
 How does the reflection on and sharing of personal values associated with 
decisions impact future decisions? 
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 How does sharing personal values with others impact their decision-making 
schemas? 
 
Hypotheses 
 
 This study used an instrument designed to measure unconscious schemas in 
ethical decision-making using a pre- and posttest design. The instrument, the DIT2, has 
proven very reliable and has been used in over 400 published studies (see “Instrument” 
section of this paper).  Extensive use of the DIT2 has found that pre- and posttest results 
without any intervention have proven to be the same with no statistically significant 
movements in scores (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000). Based on that data we 
can assume that if the planned intervention in this experiment has had no impact on 
decision-making, the statistically significant differences in the mean values of any 
measured data pre- and posttest will be 0. Given this information the hypotheses are as 
follows: 
H0: D = 0 
H1: D ≠ 0 
Where D is the difference between mean DIT2 scores. 
 
Constructs and Definitions 
 
The discussion of value-inclusive economic decision-making introduces 
constructs that not everyone might be familiar with. For purposes of this study the 
following definitions were utilized: 
Decision considerations. A decision consideration is a matter weighed or taken 
into account when forming a decision.  
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Opportunity set. The opportunity set in decision-making is defined by Sen 
(1994) as “the anticipated set of alternative outcomes…which the person reckons she can 
have through different choices of her strategy” (p. 385). One example would be a 
manager who wishes to solve a problem in which an employee has excessive absences 
(the strategy is to solve the absence problem). The opportunity set is the set of alternative 
actions the manager believes he or she can take to solve the problem. The opportunity set 
can be influenced by factors other than rational choice like ethics and epistemology 
(within the values ether) causing “menu-dependency”. 
Menu dependence. When the opportunity set is influenced by ethics, social 
behavior, epistemology, or other non-rational choice influences that narrows the 
opportunity set. A good example of menu-dependent behavior is choosing not to take the 
last apple in a bowl (Sen, 1994). 
Decision set. The decision set is the actual outcome chosen from the opportunity 
set. In the example above it would be the action the manager actually takes (or intends to 
take) to solve the problem. This could be a single decision by a single person, but is most 
often used to describe the aggregate of decisions made by a number of individuals facing 
a similar problem or situation. The decision and its impacts may influence future 
opportunity sets and decisions (Bell, 2011b; Sen, 1994). 
Personal Values. These are a type of value to which an individual is committed 
and which influences his or her behavior (Kaushal & Janjhua, 2011; Theodorson & 
Achilles, 1969). 
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Schemas. The group of values/ethics/morals an individual unconsciously 
possesses in long-term memory that structure and guide an individual’s thinking and 
decision-making. 
Values. Several short definitions of values exist including: 
“Values can refer to the desired or to the desirable, and the two are not 
equivalent…values determine our subjective definition of rationality” 
(Hofstede, 2001, pp. 1-6). 
Prescriptive statements of what ought to be (Putnam, 2002). 
However, for this study we used Hall, Guo, and Davis (2002) more comprehensive 
definition. They define values as: 
…cognitive scripts or cognitive maps or as value schemata (determinants 
of action)…[values] define the primary perspective that an individual uses 
to make sense of a new problem scenario and to generate solutions. These 
values generate perspectives that fundamentally restrict the way the 
individuals ‘see’ the world, interpret information, and make decisions… 
there are six types of personal values (perspectives) that individuals 
exhibit…theoretical, social, political, religious, aesthetic, and economic. 
(pp. 2-3) 
Values can also be used as a form of persuasion in “situations of practical 
reasoning”, which is consistent with the assertions of this paper. Bench-Capon 
(2003) describe the role of values in these cases is to “persuade rather than to 
prove, demonstrate or refute” (p. 429). He further states that: 
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…persuasion in such cases relies on a recognition that the strength of an 
argument depends on the social values that it advances, and that whether 
the attack of one argument on another succeeds depends on the 
comparative strength of the values advanced by the arguments concerned. 
(p. 429) 
It is also important to note that the terms values, morals, and ethics are 
often used interchangeably to express the same construct. For purposes of this 
paper they are considered the same. 
Values ether. It is the unseen medium that binds together all the value factors that 
lead us to a decision. 
Values reflection. Refers to internally contemplating the values associated with 
decision considerations. 
Values sharing. Refers to sharing the values you have assigned to decision 
considerations with others. 
 
Delimitations 
 
 While the types of factors beyond rational self-interest that individuals consider 
are numerous, this study will be delimited to values. Specifically, whether reflection on 
and sharing of values related to decision-making criteria impacts the way in which 
individuals make ethical decisions in a group. 
As the types of economic decisions individuals make are numerous the scope of 
the study will be delimited to microeconomic applications for individual value-inclusive 
decisions in groups. 
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Significance of the Study 
 
 Much has been written about the mechanical-mathematical models of economic 
decision-making based on assumptions of rational self-interest and utility maximization 
for both individuals and organizations, yet little attention has been given to the empirical 
study of the role of values in individual decision-making in groups and how this might 
impact microeconomic decision-making in organizations. Specifically, whether reflecting 
on and sharing values associated with decision considerations changes the unconscious 
schemas individuals’ develop that influence their decision-making. If these schemas can 
be disrupted, it provides support for the influence of group, societal, environmental, and 
organizational values in microeconomic decision-making creating implications for 
organizations and managers.  
This research is timely as academicians and practitioners are looking for ways to 
incorporate (and explain) behavioral and other factors in decision-making that go beyond 
rational choice (Pressman, 2005; Putnam, 2002; Sen, 1994, 2004, 2005; Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2009; ). Some less prominent, yet equally antithetical theories seek ways to 
create more organic models and incorporate complex systems and ‘new science’ to 
explain observations of human decision-making behavior (Bozicnik & Matjaz, 2009; 
Mikhalevskii, 1971; Wheatley, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VALUES IN MICROECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING 7 
Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
 This literature review begins by developing a theory of value-inclusive economic 
decision-making that will be used as the basis for this research. Alternative models and 
theories of value-inclusive economic decision-making from the literature will also be 
reviewed. The literature review concludes with a more specific discussion of value-
inclusive microeconomic decision-making including individual value development and 
the importance of value-inclusive microeconomic decision-making in organizations. 
 
Toward Value-Inclusive Economic Decision-Making
1
 
 
 
Much of contemporary economic thought seeks to remove all value judgments 
from the discussion of economic decision-making in favor of the rational choice 
tautology. Considerations of the “softer” social science aspects of economic thought have 
been replaced with mechanical-mathematical models in an effort to move the discipline 
closer to the hard sciences (Binmore, 2007; Nelson, 2003; Putnam, 2002). In order to 
allow empirical testing of the established mathematical models, the assumption of 
rational actors is required. To address the issues of complexity associated with economic 
decision-making that makes absolute rationality problematic, many economists consider 
the rationality assumption to be bounded rationality; limited by time, available 
information, and cognitive ability.  
                                                        
1 Note: This portion of the paper was originally published open source in 2011 in the European Journal of 
Social Sciences, 21(4), 638-649. The publisher has granted permission for use of the manuscript by the 
author for educational and non-profit purposes. It has been modified for this paper, but remains 
significantly as originally published. 
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 The purpose of this section is to explore whether there is a more holistic and 
organic approach to economic theory that allows for the coexistence of facts and values 
within economics while simultaneously moving closer to the hard sciences, specifically 
the natural and physical sciences.   
 
Statements of Fact in the Classical Language of Science: 
 
The Rational Actor 
 
 
 As discussed previously, the utilization of scientific mathematical models requires 
the assumption of rational actors in economic decision-making. This assumption has 
become problematic for many scholars (Angner & Loewenstein, 2007; Putnam, 2002; 
Tideman, 2005; Yuengert, 2000). Do individuals always behave rationally? Does one 
person define rationality the same as another? If a decision is rational for one person is 
the same decision also rational for another? Most people can look at anecdotal evidence 
in our own lives that indicates people do not always act in a rational manner. Many 
factors such as stress, emotions, experience, and moral or ethical values can all impact 
“rational” decision-making.  
 The language of science does not allow for the consideration of these 
psychological or value factors in the analysis of economic decision-making. Value 
statements are viewed as subjective, while “fact” statements are considered objective and 
appropriate for scientific analysis. In science “matters of fact” are considered statements 
that describe what “is” while “relations of ideas” (values) are prescriptive statements of 
what “ought” to be (Putnam, 2002). Putnam describes the split of values and facts in the 
“scientific” study of economics as going beyond a distinction to a jointly exhaustive and 
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mutually exclusive dichotomy that does not allow facts and values to coexist within the 
analysis. 
 
History of the Fact/Value Dichotomy 
  
 Aristotle first proposed a distinction between facts and values, which he described 
as positive (what is) and normative (what one should do) inquiry. However, until the 
early twentieth century positive and normative inquiry within the sciences, while 
distinctive, coexisted in a hierarchical relationship. Ethics/prudence was “by nature above 
all other disciplines”. This normative inquiry made use of the subordinate inquiries “in 
pursuit of the highest human ends, and was in turn the justification and motivating force 
behind the inquiries of the various subordinate sciences” (Yuengert, 2000, p. 1).  
 The fact/value dichotomy of the early twentieth century created problems 
regarding how “facts” should be defined within the language of science. Putnam (2002) 
provides a comprehensive discussion of these issues summarized in the following 
paragraphs. The logical positivism that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century 
believed that judgments fell into one of three classifications: 
1) “Synthetic” judgments were those that were empirically verifiable or falsifiable.  
2) “Analytic” judgments were true [or false] on the basis of logical rules alone.  
3) “Cognitively Meaningless” judgments included ethical, metaphysical, and 
aesthetic judgments. These value judgments were not considered within the field 
of science. 
Distinguishing between synthetic and analytic judgments was problematic in part 
because there was a difference of opinion about whether the truths of mathematics were 
analytic or synthetic. Kant believed mathematics is both synthetic and a priori while the 
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logical positivists believed the principles of mathematics are analytical. When the 
assumption (as discussed by Putnam, 2002) that the principles of mathematics are 
synthetic is removed, there becomes a wide range of ordinary distinctions (both analytic 
and purely descriptive) available. 
Another problem raised by the logical positivists was that in order for the 
synthetic/analytic distinction to be true, it must work when applied to every statement of 
theoretical physics. For example, we must ask if the Principle of the Conservation of 
Energy is analytic or synthetic in order to fully “rationalize” physics. This proved to be 
problematic, as atoms could not be “observed” before microscopes; and physics moved 
into the areas of relativity theory and quantum mechanics. Yet many scientists believed 
that a scientific statement of fact must be “conclusively verifiable by confrontation and 
direct experience” (Putnam, 2002, p. 22).  The language of science continued to insist, 
“the predicates admitted into the ‘factual’ part of the language of science had to be 
‘observational terms’ or reducible (by specified and limited means) to observation terms” 
(Putnam, 2002, p.23). The “reductionistic unholistic view” (Bozicnik & Matjaz, 2009) of 
science made discussions about bacteria, electrons, charges, or the gravitational field 
irrational.  
 
Application Problems of Mechanical-Mathematical Economic Models 
 
 
 As the previous discussion of Putnam’s work emphasizes, the language of the 
hard sciences seeks rational outcomes based on statements of fact that are empirically 
measurable. This requires the dichotomy of facts and values. However, defining “facts” is 
problematic even in the hard sciences.  
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 In an effort to allow “scientific” mathematical analysis of economics, the 
assumption must be made that the actors involved act in a rational, self-interested manner 
with factual judgments separated from value judgments in economic decision-making. 
The implication of the assumption of rationality is that actors will seek to maximize 
utility through their economic decision-making. This also assumes that they have all 
information required to make the optimal decision, have not learned from previous 
experiences, and are not influenced by other people; rationality is assumed to be inherent 
(Putnam, 2002). 
 Researchers in strategic behavior have found problems with these assumptions 
when using game theory to study rational behavior in small groups where individual 
actors can impact the well-being of others. The results found that multiple equilibria were 
possible and that a “very high order” of rationality was needed to determine an 
individual’s optimal strategy. The studies also found that learning and natural selection 
can have an impact on optimal behavior in practice (Schmalensee, 1991). Other 
experiments found that while individual “reasoners” behave intelligently, they do behave 
differently than the theory of pure economic rationality would expect (“Philosophy of 
Economics,” 1998)  
 To address the issue of the inability of individual actors to consistently act in a 
rational manner, the subject of economics was divided into micro-and macroeconomics to 
accommodate (and inspired by) Keynes and his General Theory (Groenewegen, 2003). 
Keynes believed that economic behavior should be measured at the aggregate level and 
not the “atomic” or micro level of neoclassical theory (Togati, 2001). Using the rational, 
mechanical, mathematical, and fact driven structure of the hard sciences made discussion 
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of economics at the “atomic” level as difficult as it did for physics. However, Keynes’ 
approach was consistent with the increasingly narrow specialization within the hard 
sciences (Bozicnik & Matjaz, 2009). 
 The mechanical aspects of the classical language of science are also problematic 
when applied to the study of economics. The mechanical, fact driven model of classical 
science creates a relatively closed system of exploration. As a result, economic models 
utilizing this system end up closed within the confines of science. An extensive list of 
assumptions, described by Mikhalevskii (1971), are required to fit within the confines of 
a closed, mechanical system. Among them are the assumptions of “a consistent, stable, 
and …constant system of values” and conformity to the utility maximization criterion as 
the only constant and final goal.  Mikhalevskii also finds “the narrowness of the 
statistical and dynamic definition of individual and social motivation” to be problematic 
(pp. 7-8). Mechanical models fail to consider relationships and their impact on the overall 
economic system. He states there is no: 
…mechanism for explaining internal conflicts in the process of development 
(except competition) on the basis of the influence of the environment and the 
internal structure of the very system through direct relations and feedback and 
compounding relations based upon them… (p. 8)  
There is also no mechanism to measure the impact of individuals on the system when 
utilizing a Keynesian macroeconomic approach (Bozicnik & Matjaz, 2009).  
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The New Science 
 
 
Language Beyond “Fact” 
 
As previously discussed, the classical language of science, using restrictive 
statements of fact, made discussion about bacteria, electrons, charges, or the gravitational 
field irrational. This became increasingly problematic as “new science” emerged in 
biology, evolution, chaos theory, relativity theory, and quantum physics. Suddenly 
science was forced to look at the world in a different way. The world began to appear less 
mechanical and orderly, and more creative, dynamic, and engaged in continuous change 
while maintaining order. (Wheatley, 2006)  
 Ganley (1995) discusses the revolutionary fervor of theoretical physics at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Areas of expanded theoretical interest for scientists 
included quantum physics, the special and general theories of relativity, a theory of the 
inner workings of the atom, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, quantum mechanics, and 
the early stages of research in quantum electrodynamics. Research in the “new science” 
created changes in methodology for scientists. The world around them was no longer 
viewed as strictly mechanical and outside our influence. Ganley quotes Albert Einstein 
regarding the new physics: “physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and 
are not, however, it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world” (p. 397). 
 Establishment of the new language of physics also required a new way of thinking 
about the world. Scientists were forced to look beyond “facts” to possibilities, 
probabilities and not just predictions. They came to realize that the natural world did not 
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always behave the same way twice, yet maintained orderliness (Wheatley, 2006). As 
Fritjof Capra (1983) stated:  
In their struggle to grasp this new reality, scientists became painfully aware 
that their basic concepts, their language, and their whole way of thinking were 
inadequate to describe atomic phenomena. Their problem was not only 
intellectual but involved an intense emotional and existential experience… (p. 
76) 
One example included experiments that determined electrons behave in an inconsistent 
manner. Sometimes they behave like particles (matter) and at other times they behave 
like waves (energy) (Bozicnik & Matjaz, 2009). 
 Bozicnik & Matjaz (2009) describes the evolution of scientific thought moving 
from determinism, to interdependence, to dialectical dynamics that recognize the “unity 
in diversity of everything around us” (p.347). 
 
The New Economics? 
 
 While changes in language and methodology were being made in the scientific 
community to change the way natural phenomena were discussed, predicted, and 
described, the economic discipline was slow to respond. Noted historian and philosopher 
of economic thought, Philip Mirowski, believed that neoclassical economics was based 
on mid-nineteenth century physics that clung to outdated mathematical techniques that 
did not seek to make economics like science, but “a mathematically rigorous discipline” 
(Ganley, 1995, p.398). Science had evolved, with scientists like Einstein allowing for 
nonobservable factors (Togati, 2001). However, the study of economics has not evolved 
in the same manner primarily in the name of mathematical rigor. 
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 Economists agree that mathematics is still important to “provide a social-scientific 
basis for understanding, explaining, and, perhaps, predicting economic phenomena” 
(Routledge, 1998, para 10). However, when economists ask a question such as: “Are 
inflation and unemployment related?” they may be able to use mathematical models to 
answer yes or no, but economists need to go beyond mathematics to explain the often-
unobservable causes. On this topic the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Sciences 
states: 
…the approach to economic theorizing that stipulates that the discipline is 
purely formal will not aid in shedding light on these real, though 
unobservable, economic mechanisms. On this line of thought, the persistent 
mathematization of economics ought to be construed as a means to an end 
rather than the end itself. The formal or mathematical machinery of economics 
is intellectually valuable only insofar as it contributes to a better 
understanding of real, empirically given economic processes, causes, and 
systems. (para. 10) 
 The “new economics” should look beyond the assumptions of economic actors 
being rational, self-interested, and autonomous maximizers required to fit the science of 
economics into the “Newtonian idea of a clockwork world” (Nelson, 2003, p. 5). Looking 
beyond requires economists to include unobservable factors such as values, ethics, 
expectations, motivations, culture, and the impact of relationships and cooperation on 
economic decision-making. 
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Origins of a Potential New Economics 
 
 
This paper has discussed how the origins of the neoclassical school of economic 
research was found in mid-nineteenth century physics (Ganley, 1995) as economists 
sought to utilize the same mathematical methodology.  The early twentieth century 
brought a division of micro- and macroeconomics to accommodate Keynes by removing 
the problems associated with the rational explanation of both science and economics at 
the “atomic” level (Groenewegen, 2003). While the methodology of science was 
evolving as new fields of inquiry emerged, the field of economics did not respond in a 
similar manner. Some scholars might argue that Keynes was using Einstein’s approach to 
the theory of relativity when he developed his General Theory of Employment, Interest, 
and Money, (Togati, 2001) others, including this author, see applications to Einstein’s 
theory of relativity that are quite different. If the origins of the new economics didn’t 
reside with Keynes, where did (or will) they come from?  The answer to this question 
requires revisiting the origins of the science of economics. 
 The first attempt to establish an analytical form of economic science was made by 
François Quesnay and a group of French statesmen and philosophers in the mid-
eighteenth century. The foundation of their policy was obedience to Nature (Marshall, 
1890/1920). However, as Marshall goes on to explain, these early economists lost their 
way when they attempted to incorporate the scientific methods of the physical sciences: 
…there was much in the tone and temper of their treatment of political and 
social questions which was prophetic of a later age. They fell however into a 
confusion of thought which was common even among scientific men of their 
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time, but which has been banished after a long struggle from the physical 
sciences. They confused the ethical principle of conformity to Nature, which 
is expressed in the imperative mood, and prescribes certain laws of action, 
with those causal laws which science discovers by interrogating Nature, and 
which are expressed in the indicative mood. (Marshall, 1890/1920; Appendix 
B.7) 
 Statements of fact rather than signals of direction continue to dominate economic 
thought in the twenty-first century. Another important point to note regarding the 
structure of the emerging economic science as described by both Quesnay and Adam 
Smith is that the micro- and macroeconomic elements were blended and merged, treating 
the subject as a whole without artificial distinctions. The intellectual climate also allowed 
for positive and normative economics to exist simultaneously. Smith, and later Marshall, 
blended their discussion of economics with a mix of facts and theories (Bozicnik & 
Matjaz, 2009; Groenewegen, 2003).  
After Quesnay, Marshall credits Adam Smith as having the next great step in 
advance within the discipline of economics. The very title of Smith’s major work, An 
Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, implies economic systems 
are natural phenomena. It also calls for the exploration of causation, not simply factual 
description. He also recognizes the unobservable by noting that while man may attempt 
to control these natural economic systems, they continue to be “led by an invisible hand 
to promote an end which was not part of his intention” (Smith, 1776/1904; para. IV.2.9).  
Smith (1776/1904) was also concerned with the “evolutionary factors in 
explaining economic development,” which included discussion about the nature of 
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society and government, and the role of culture and the arts. Smith saw economic systems 
as dynamic and constantly changing (Bozicnik & Matjaz, 2009; Groenewegen, 2003). He 
also recognized the role of “moral” and “natural” sentiments of economic actors in 
decision-making (Smith, 1759/1790). 
Sen (2004) discusses a deeper analysis of Adam Smith’s work that demonstrates 
that Smith did not believe self-interest was the only motivator of people. He states: “…he 
discussed extensively the prevalence and the important social role of such values as 
sympathy, generosity, public-spiritedness and other affiliative concerns” (p.9). In another 
work Sen (1994) discusses that the pioneers of utility theory (including John Stuart Mill, 
William Stanley Jevons, Francis Y. Edgeworth, and Alfred Marshall) explicitly accepted 
a variety of motivations for economic decision-making.  
Based on this discussion it is fair to conclude that early economic theorists 
believed that the discussion of economics belonged within the context of our natural and 
holistic world, which includes multiple motivations for economic decision-making. The 
science of economics lost this framework of discussion when it moved toward the 
increasingly factual language of the physical sciences. The language and methodology of 
the sciences changed at the beginning of the twentieth-century, while the field of 
economics remained trapped within the mid-nineteenth century model. However, 
returning to the origins of economic science reveals greater parity with the “new science” 
than current mechanical-mathematical models. Based on this evidence, is it possible to 
build a theoretical framework for the discussion of economic decision-making that is 
consistent with both classical economic thought and the new science? 
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A Model of Decision-Making Beyond the Rational Actor 
 
 
 While the discussion of economic models within the context of classical 
economic thought and the new science has broad applications, the limited space of this 
paper requires the scope of this discussion to be limited to economic decision-making. 
While the discussion thus far has focused on a potential “new economics,” it is probably 
necessary to further define and identify what that encompasses. To be consistent with 
contemporary scientific thought, this paper will use Bozicnik and Matjaz (2009) 
description of a holistic, interdependence-based system that recognizes the “unity in 
diversity of everything around us.” This “new science” view of economic systems allows 
for:  
1) Inclusion of the unobservable.  
2) Recognition of complex systems. 
3) The ability of the individual “atomic” actor to influence the system and 
determine “reality” with their interventions. 
4) The ability of the system to influence the actor. 
5) Multiple equilibria and inconsistent behavior. 
6) Recognition of the role of relationships and cooperation in economic behavior. 
7) Inclusion of values/ethics/morality. 
8) Inclusion of information and learning in decision-making.  
This view is also consistent with classical economic thought in that it looks at 
economic systems holistically with no division between micro and macro elements, or 
positive and normative statements. Fact and theory are allowed to coexist. It allows for 
the inclusion of “sentiments” (values, ethics, and morals), the unobservable (i.e. the 
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invisible hand), the exploration of causation across a broad spectrum of possibilities, and 
allows for “evolution” of economic systems with changing cause and effect that can 
include multiple goals and objectives over time.  
 
 
Einstein and the Ether 
 
 The major inspiration for the value-inclusive economic decision-making model 
discussed later in this paper was an address delivered on May 5
th
, 1920, in the University 
of Leyden by Albert Einstein entitled Ether and the Theory of Relativity. This insight into 
Einstein’s views of the “new science” has strong parallels with a potential theoretical 
model for economic decision-making.  
In his address, Einstein rejects Newton’s notion of dualism in nature, both in 
general and as it relates to the theory of gravity. Specifically, that there can be “reciprocal 
action only through contact, and not through immediate action at a distance” (Einstein, 
1920, p. 1). To solve this problem, and to unify the view of the nature of forces, Einstein 
supports the existence of an “ether.” The ether is an inert medium that fills up universal 
space and conveys forces by elastic deformation of the medium. This explains how 
movement is possible with both direct contact (mechanical and seen) and distant contact 
(non-mechanical and unseen). This is much like a boat being able to be moved through 
the water either by pushing it (direct contact) or by the ripples created by the wake of 
another boat (distant contact).  
The ether allows both seen mechanical forces like densities, velocities, and 
stresses to coexist with the unseen electric and magnetic forces, and abandons the 
dualism that existed. He also states: “the ether of the general theory of relativity is a 
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medium which is itself devoid of all mechanical and kinematical qualities, but helps to 
determine mechanical (and electromagnetic) events” (Einstein, 1920, p. 4). Einstein also 
describes ether as being indistinguishable from ponderable matter, which, at least in part, 
subsists in the ether. Within the theory of relativity the state of the ether is “at every place 
determined by connections with the matter and the state of the ether in neighbouring 
places…” (p. 5). In other words, the state of the ether is determined by its relationships 
with the matter and its state relative to the states around it.  
While the ether was necessary for Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity, he is 
said to have rejected it later when he developed his Special Theory of Relativity. 
Hawking (2001) states that Einstein believed that the notion of an ether was “redundant,” 
as proposed in a 1905 article. Yet in the 1920 address discussed here he does not reject 
the notion of an ether, simply a change in his conception of it. Einstein states: “More 
careful reflection teaches us, however, that the special theory of relativity does not 
compel us to deny ether” (p. 3).  Einstein believed we could continue to assume the 
existence of an ether, but we must not ascribe to it a definite state of motion, removing all 
mechanical characteristics as discussed earlier in this section. He does believe, however, 
that the ether can still be characterized as a medium. 
 
Einstein Meets Economics 
 
The problem with dualism in nature faced by Einstein parallels with the dualism 
problem associated with the fact/value dichotomy of current economic thought. The 
assumption of the dichotomy is that economic statements can be made through fact alone 
and not through the influence of values. According to Hume, we cannot determine an 
“ought” from an “is” (Putnam, 2002). However, to be consistent with the new science, 
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the fact/value dichotomy should be removed because “evaluation and description are 
interwoven and interdependent” (Pressman, 2005; p. 485)  
The values ether. To unify this view of economics the existence of a “values 
ether” as a medium through which statements, thought, and information move is 
proposed. Einstein (1920) describes the ether as both conditioning the behavior of inert 
masses, and being conditioned by them. In the economic decision-making process (which 
moves through the “values ether”), the ether not only conditions our decisions, but is also 
conditioned by our decisions. Also consistent with Einstein’s theory, economic decisions 
are partially conditioned by decisions outside the territory under consideration (see 
Einstein, 1920, p. 4). While the decisions themselves do not reside within the values 
ether, the statements, thoughts, information, and previous decisions necessary to make 
new decisions move through the medium of the values ether and help determine 
economic decisions.  
The ongoing conditioning of the ether and the statements, thoughts, information, 
and previous decisions moving through it causes learning to take place and economic 
decisions to change over time. It also causes individuals, businesses, and societies to react 
differently to different economic stimuli even when they have the same information, 
especially over time. Mikhalevskii (1971) sees the future of economic analysis being 
based on continuous learning: “…the entire mechanism of economic decisions must be 
based on a heurorhythmic procedure” (p.20). 
Relationships and cooperation. Pressman (2005) discusses the role of Pareto 
Optimality in modern economic thought that goes hand in hand with the assumptions of 
individual self-interest and rationality. For an outcome to be Pareto Optimal, no one can 
VALUES IN MICROECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING 23 
be made better off without sacrificing the well-being of at least one person. As a result, 
the situation cannot “unambiguously be improved upon, since one person’s gain will be 
another person’s loss” (p. 487). Yet, neoclassical economics, measured at the macro 
level, does not allow us to compare individual gains and losses (Pressman, 2005).  
Are relationships, cooperation, and rationality able to coexist? Pressman states: 
“…rationality has a social dimension to it; what is rational in a situation depends not just 
on what I do or choose, but also on how others react to me and to my choices” (p.490). 
This concept of relationships is consistent with Einstein’s statement that “…the state of 
the ether is at every place determined by connections with the matter and the state of the 
ether in neighbouring places…” (1920, p. 5).  
An understanding of relationships in economic decision-making helps place 
individual decisions in context. For example, is an individual more likely to make an 
unethical economic decision such as cheating on their income taxes if their superior at 
work has encouraged them to do so? Sen (1994) discusses how social norms can have an 
impact on decision-making. He uses the examples of not eating the last apple, or 
automatically grabbing the largest slice of cake. Also, the decisions of individuals living 
in societies with collectivist norms will be very different from those living in societies 
with individualist norms. 
Another motivation for decision-making explored by Sen (1994) includes the 
consideration of the consequences of individual actions on others. Will someone else be 
harmed or will someone be disappointed in the decision-maker due to the decision?  Is 
the decision-maker trying to imitate the behavior of others? What are the decision-makers 
incentives within the different groups they identify with (Sen, 2004)? These relationship 
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considerations exist within the values ether and shape economic decisions. At the same 
time, economic decisions shape relationships. 
The game theory classic, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, demonstrates that the optimal 
solution can sometimes be gained through cooperation. While the game does not 
eliminate the possibility that individuals are self-interested, as the cooperative solution 
also optimizes each individual’s benefit. It does, however, demonstrate that the 
consideration of others should (and does) exist in individual economic decision-making. 
The previous discussion regarding relationships also implies that there are occasions 
when actors might not act in their own best interest in order to protect the interests of 
others. Once again, this does not necessarily mean that individuals are not self-interested 
(as an individual might gain more utility from helping someone else than from satisfying 
their own immediate need), it simply means there are considerations in economic 
decision-making that involve other people. Regional and international trade networks are 
examples of cooperation that have economic benefits at a macroeconomic level as they 
can increase resistance to recessionary shocks (He & Deem, 2010).  
Sen (1994) suggests that due to social dependence, each member of a group 
considers not only their independent self-interest, but also treats the joint strategy as one 
of their options. In some cases this might even lead to individuals within the group being 
less well off then others when cohesive actions are more desired. In his example he cites 
gender-unequal societies in which women themselves might give a higher priority to the 
interests and well being of the joint family unit while perpetuating their own inequality 
and lower status. 
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Pressman (2005) concludes that the fact/value dichotomy and notion of self-
interested rationality trivializes values because relationships and cooperation with other 
people creates a “social surplus.” By including other elements of behavior to the 
observation of microeconomic behavior something much greater than a simple 
aggregation of Pareto Optimality of microeconomic level data occurs. Mikhalevskii 
(1971) states:  
Even in the area of the purely economic system of values, goals, and norms, 
not only is the law of superadditivity justified, but each given goal at the 
macroeconomic level is qualitatively different from the corresponding 
microeconomic values. (p. 19) 
Sen (1994) concludes that including “other-regarding concerns in the formulation of 
rational choice” will provide “better description and greater explanatory and predictive 
power” (p.389). 
Relativity. Another implication of Einstein’s statement regarding the state of the 
ether being “at every place determined by connections with the matter and that state of 
the ether in neighbouring places…” (1920, p. 5) is the concept (and theory) of relativity. 
This relativity takes two forms in economic decision-making: 1) Decisions (including 
values) relative to the values of others; and 2) The observed meaning of decisions 
(including values) by others. While some might argue that the values ether represents 
values (or moral) relativism, this author argues that it is simply a descriptive relativism 
that recognizes that people disagree about the right or wrong course of action to be taken 
under similar circumstances when presented with the same facts. Values, experience and 
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learning, perceptions of justice, relationships, and joint cooperation all play a part in this 
relativity.  
Ganley (1995) remarks that Veblen also recognized the concept that “conceptual 
meaning was that of the observer” (p. 403). Often an individual’s decision will be shaped 
based on how they believe another person will perceive their decision. For example, a job 
applicant may decide not to call a perspective new employer more than once because, 
while eager to have the job, they don’t want the potential employer to think they are too 
assertive or “pushy”.  
Actors may also compare their values to those of others when making decisions. 
When we observe a co-worker demonstrating generosity with a substantial donation to 
the office charity campaign, we might wish to appear equally (or even more) generous 
when we make our donation. As statements, thoughts, and information move through the 
values ether, decisions are formed creating new statements, thoughts, and information 
that are all relative to one another. 
 
Classifications of Statements, Thoughts, and Information 
 
 
The mid-nineteenth century language of science that continues to dominate 
economics requires consideration of “matters of fact” exclusively. However, the “new 
science” recognizes the need to discuss possibilities and probabilities in a world that is 
creative, dynamic, and engaged in continuous change while maintaining order. Revisiting 
the pioneers of the science of economics, including Quesnay, Smith, and Marshall, finds 
their approaches to be more holistic and consistent with the new science. They saw the 
positive and normative (fact/value) as interdependent, micro and macro-level economics 
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coexisting, and economic systems as evolving and changing over time. They went 
beyond statements of fact to explore signals of direction. Like the physical sciences in 
which all physical laws continue to be obeyed, new economic systems need to be 
complex systems that are “self-organized structures that absorb and dissipate energy” 
while at the same time obeying some “simple behavioural rules in time and space” 
(Foster, 2005, p. 1). 
Based on the assumptions of the pioneers of the science of economics, it is 
possible to classify the statements, thoughts, and information formed at the atomic or 
macro level that move through the ether into four broad categories: 1) Facts influenced by 
values; 2) Values influenced by facts; 3) Distinctive integration; 4) Full integration. 
 
Facts Influenced by Values 
 
 An economist gives a statement of fact: “The unemployment rate is 9.6%.” This 
statement is influenced by values because society has decided what facts are important to 
measure and report. Schmalensee (1991) states: “Economic research, like research in any 
scientific discipline, is driven in large part by an agenda that reflects the profession’s 
shared sense of what problems are tractable and interesting at the time” (p. 115). The 
statements of fact move through the values ether. 
 
Values Influenced by Facts 
 
 Society identifies a problem: “The unemployment rate is too high.” This value 
statement is influenced by facts because experience has shown that high unemployment 
has negative consequences on both individuals and societies. The value statements move 
through the values ether.  
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Distinctive Integration 
 
 These types of statements, thoughts, and information use both fact and value 
statements, but distinguish between the two. Value statement: “The unemployment rate 
should be reduced to 3.5% for full-employment to be obtained.” Fact statement: “In the 
past we have tried the following solutions with the following results.” These combined, 
yet distinctive fact and value statements move through the ether. 
 
Full Integration 
 
 This category is where most decisions and actions occur. Legislators use the art of 
economics to prescribe solutions to lower the unemployment rate based on an integration 
of facts and values: “To lower unemployment we will increase government spending.” 
The policies move through the ether and stimulate more facts based on values, values 
based on facts, and distinctive integration of the two leading to more decisions using full 
integration. 
 Figure 1 on the following page represents a potential ‘New Science’ Value-
Inclusive Model of Economic Decision-Making that positions the four classifications of 
statements, thoughts, and information within the values ether. The arrows indicate that 
they move through the values ether both influencing and being influenced by each other 
and the collective values ether.  
Role of Relationships, Cooperation, and the Invisible Hand 
 
 
 Throughout time the four types of statements move through the values ether, 
conditioning decisions and being conditioned by them. Over time, the values in the ether 
evolve and some are lost. Within the ether resides the gravitational pull of relationships 
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and cooperation that serves as the force that keeps us interconnected and dependent in our 
decision-making while shaping the values ether and being shaped by it. On the edge of 
this “Economic Universe” is the invisible hand that pushes and shapes the ever-
expanding universe while containing it within a framework of self-organization. The 
model is both descriptive and predictive of a menu of outcomes. 
Figure 2.1. Bell’s ‘New Science’ Value-Inclusive Model of Economic Decision-Making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The incorporation of facts and values (including their distinction and integration) as well 
as relationships, cooperation, and the invisible hand results in what Sen (1994) describes 
as “menu-dependent” outcomes that go beyond rational self-interest (utility).   
The payoff function in a menu-dependent system does not only include the actual 
outcomes that emerge, but also the set of alternative outcomes (“the opportunity set” or 
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“the menu”) that the individual determines they can choose by executing different 
strategies. This menu of outcomes (or signals of direction) includes considerations of 
how others will behave thereby creating multiple strategies. The actions of others [and 
presumably value and cooperation considerations] may reduce the opportunity or menu 
set over time moving the individual to a decision (Sen, 1994, p. 385).  The invisible hand 
can also play a part by changing overall environmental factors that can impact decision-
making (See Figure 1, above).  
 
Final Thoughts On The ‘New Science’ Model 
 
 The mid-nineteenth century language of “facts” within the scientific 
discipline moved the science of economics to a mechanical-mathematical method of 
economic analysis based on the assumption of individual rational actors in 
economic decision-making. The classical scientific language of “facts” and 
rationality required the removal of the consideration of values, relationships, and 
cooperation in decision-making. Consideration of the “unseen” was believed to be 
irrational. A forced separation of positive from normative statements was also 
required resulting in an assumption that what “ought” to be could not be derived 
from what “is.”  As the assumption of rational actors became problematic, Keynes’ 
theories led to the separation of micro and macroeconomics with measurement of 
economic behavior focused at the aggregate level. This approach minimized the 
impact of individual actors, while maintaining the assumption of rationality within 
the system.   
 The early twentieth-century brought changes in the language of science as 
scientists began exploring areas that no longer fit nicely within the confines of the 
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fact based, classical language of science. The science of economics, however, has 
been slow to move toward a more dynamic approach to decision-making. The 
model proposed in this paper attempts to return the description of economic 
decision-making to a holistic approach incorporating facts and values, the positive 
and normative, relationships and cooperation, and the micro and macro level 
consistent with the pioneers of economic thought. At the same time the proposed 
model attempts to incorporate the language and concepts associated with the 
complex systems approach of the “new science.”  
 While the model is descriptive in nature, it has the predicative potential to 
establish a menu of alternative outcomes (the opportunity set) based on a perceived set of 
strategies (or signals of direction). The strategies (and the corresponding alternative 
outcomes) will become increasingly limited over time based on the actions of others. The 
proposed model is applicable to both micro and macro level decisions and incorporates 
the dynamic nature of decision-making influenced by facts, values, relationships, 
cooperation, and learning as well as their relativity to one another
2
. 
 
Alternative Models and Theories of Value-Inclusive Economic Decision-Making 
 
 
Suramaniam’s Fact/Value Distinction  
 
While few models exist that attempt to integrate facts and values in a universal 
decision-making model, Subramaniam (1963) does provide on alternative. In an effort to 
avoid the fact/value dichotomy, his model includes values but does incorporate a 
fact/value distinction. His purpose for establishing a distinction is to retain the concept of 
                                                        
2 Note: This is the end of the previously published work. 
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rationality. In fact, he suggests incorporating values makes his model an example of a 
“perfect rational decision” (p. 236).  
 In Subramaniam’s (1963) model (See Figure 2.2, following page) individuals 
begin by recalling all primary values that are relevant to the situation. The next step is to 
gather all relevant facts. 
Figure 2.2. Subramaniam’s (1963) Diagram of a Model of a Perfect Rational Decision 
 
   Primary Value—X  Primary Value—Y  Primary Value—Z 
    +   +   + 
   Relevant Facts  Relevant Facts  Relevant Facts 
            
   Derived Value  Derived Value  Derived Value 
   Grade 1 = End  Grade 1 = End  Grade 1 = End 
    +   +   + 
   Relevant Facts  Relevant Facts  Relevant Facts 
           
   Derived Value  Derived Value  Derived Value 
   Grade 2  Grade 2  Grade 2 
   = means in re:  = means in re:  = means in re: 
   Derivative Value Derivative Value Derivative Value 
   Grade 1 and End Grade 1 and End Grade 1 and End 
   in re: Derivative in re: Derivative in re: Derivative 
   Value Grade 3  Value Grade 3  Value Grade 3 
    +   +   + 
   Relevant Facts  Relevant Facts  Relevant Facts 
           
ALTERNATIVES Derivative Value Derivative Value Derivative Value 
   Grade 3 = means in re: Grade 3 = means in re: Grade 3 = means in re: 
   Derivative Value Derivative Value Derivative Value 
   Grade 2 and  Grade 2 and  Grade 2 and 
   End in re:  End in re:  End in re: 
   Derivative Value Derivative Value Derivative Value 
   Grade 4  Grade 4  Grade 4 
Moment of Choice  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
    +   +    
Future   Relevant Facts  Relevant Facts  Eliminated as 
irrelevant 
          
   Derivative Value Derivative Value 
   Grade 4 =  Grade 4 = 
   Consequences  Consequences 
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This process of alternating between gathering relevant values and relevant facts continues 
until the moment of choice. The consequence of the choice moves into the future and 
informs relevant facts and values in the next decision, unless the choice is determined 
irrelevant for future decisions. While this model is a viable alternative, the constant 
distinction of facts and values has not held up over time. 
As an example we have seen how marketing, in its evolution to the relationship 
era, has started to incorporate facts, values, and emotions into consumer decision-making. 
(Bell, 2011a; Kotler, Kartajaya, & Setiawan, 2010; Peter & Olson, 2010). We’ve learned 
that multiple decision-making factors can exist either sequentially (distinctive) or 
simultaneously (integrated) (Bell, 2011a; Carrera & Oceja, 2007; Taylor, 2009). 
Microeconomic consumer decisions are not made based on the distinction of facts and 
values resulting in rational choices made by rational actors, but on the integration of 
multiple cues sometimes resulting in less than rational behavior in the classic sense. 
While distinction can exist at times it is integration that leads to decisions (Bell, 2011a; 
Ramanathan & Shiv, 2001).  
 
The Moral/Non-Moral Normative Judgment Distinction  
 
Huei-Chun Su (2010) explores the dichotomous distinction of positive and 
normative economics as discussed by David Colander (2001), John Stuart Mill (1963), 
and British economist (and father of John Maynard Keynes) John Neville Keynes (1917). 
There is a place for a positive/normative distinction as described by Colander, however, 
if the analysis of economic issues resulting in applied policies is to be complete, the art of 
economics integrating the positive and normative approaches must be included.  
Su (2010) compares Mill’s proposed distinction between science and art, Keynes’ 
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insistence on the use of a distinct positive science in economic decision making, 
Friedman’s (1966) concerns that objectivity through positive economics alone is difficult 
as economics studies the “interrelations of human beings” (Friedman, 1966, p. 4), and 
Colander’s three-fold approach that suggests that “when conducting applied policy 
analysis, factors which are ruled out in positive economic analysis have to be added back 
in. These include non-economic factors and the operational details of institutions” (Su, 
2010, p. 2). In comparing the approaches she is looking for common ground and a way to 
bridge the gaps. One troubling area she seeks to resolve is Colander’s assertion that 
normative judgments are value judgments, which doesn’t allow for the removal of 
subjectivity insisted on by the other scholars. Even Friedman (1966), who has concerns 
about objectivity, only sought to revise positive economics to eliminate “fundamental 
differences in basic values, differences about which men can ultimately fight” (p. 5).  
To attempt to solve this problem Su (2010) proposes the integration of the 
positive and normative, but with a distinction between moral normative judgments and 
non-moral normative judgments with the former occurring rarely. While she puts this 
forth as her proposal to solve the conflicts between the philosophies, the original concept 
of a moral/non-moral distinction in normative judgment comes from Frankena (1973). 
She borrows from Frankena (1963) when she defines moral values as “not about actions 
or kinds of action, but about persons, motives, intentions, traits of character, and the like, 
and we say of them that they are morally good, bad, virtuous, vicious…and so on” 
(Frankena, 1963, p. 8; Su, 2010, p. 24). She describes non-moral judgments as 
“predominantly determined by judgments based on the knowledge of facts and scientific 
theories, not moral values or rules” (Su, 2010, p. 24). Table 2.1 on the following page 
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from Frankena (1973) provides examples of the distinction he has prescribed. While Su 
(2010) and Frankena’s (1973) normative judgment distinction has merit, the theory still 
seeks to minimize the impact of values on the analysis and decision-making process.  
 
The Normative-Affective Approach 
 
Amitai Etzioni (1988) proposes not only an integration of normative-affective 
factors (emotions and values) into neoclassical economic models, but that often logical-
empirical factors (the basis of rational decision-making) are not used at all in economic 
decision-making. One problem the author notes with observing and modeling the 
prominence of emotions and values in decision-making is that once the decisions are 
made “Normative-affective (N/A) factors are subject to logical-empirical (L/E) research 
by observers, but those actors who make them draw on value-commitments and 
emotional involvements, not information or reason” (p. 126). As a result the distinct 
combination of N/A and L/E is not adequately measured or known.
 Table 2.1  
 
Adapted from William K. Frankena’s Kinds of Normative Judgments from Ethics (1973) 
 
Kinds of Normative Judgments 
Ethical or moral judgments proper: Nonmoral normative judgments: 
Judgments of moral obligation  
(deontic judgments): 
Judgments of moral value  
(aretaic judgments): 
Judgments of nonmoral value: Judgments of nonmoral 
obligation: 
 
Particular, e.g. 
(assuming 
terms are used 
in their moral 
senses),  
a. I ought not to    
escape from 
prison now.  
b. You should 
become a 
missionary.  
c. What he did 
was wrong.  
 
General, e.g.,  
a. We ought to 
keep our 
agreements.  
b. Love is the 
fulfillment of 
the moral law.  
c. All men have 
a right to 
freedom.  
 
Particular, e.g.,  
a. My 
grandfather was 
a good man.  
b. Xavier was a 
saint.  
c. He is 
responsible for 
what he did.  
d. You deserve 
to be punished.  
e. Her character 
is admirable.  
f. His motive 
was good.  
 
General, e.g.,  
a. Benevolence is a 
virtue.  
b. Jealousy is an 
ignoble motive.  
c. The man who can 
forgive such 
carelessness is a saint.  
d. The good man does 
not cheat or steal.  
 
Particular, e.g.,  
a. That is a good 
car.  
b. Miniver 
Cheevy did not 
have a very good 
life.  
 
General, e.g.,  
a. Pleasure is good in 
itself.  
b. Democracy is the 
best form of 
government.  
 
Particular, e.g.,  
a. You ought 
to buy a new 
suit.  
b. You just 
have to go to 
that concert.  
 
General, e.g.,  
a. In building 
a bookcase 
one should use 
nails, not 
Scotch tape.  
b. The right 
thing to do on 
fourth down 
with thirteen 
yards to go is 
to punt.  
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While economists might be concerned this approach leads to ‘irrationality’ Etzioni and 
others warn not to confuse ‘irrationality’ with ‘nonrationality’. As Gigerenzer (2001) 
states, “The term ‘nonrational’ denotes a heterogeneous class of theories of decision-
making designed to overcome problems with traditional ‘rational’ theories” (p. 3304). 
Yet, the decisions that are made remain completely rational for the individual decision-
maker based on their decision criteria regardless of whether they are the traditional utility 
maximizing, cost/benefit factors or emotional/value factors. Etzioni argues the 
normative-affective approach is nonrational, while demonstrating rational characteristics 
at the same time simply through a different process of decision-making. 
The author believes N/A factors serve as the baseline for decision-making and 
should therefore be the primary level of analysis with L/E factors added in later. Etzioni 
(1988) asserts:  
…normative-affective factors shape to a significant extent decision-
making, to the extent it takes place, the information gathered, the ways it 
is processed, the inferences that are drawn, the opinions that are being 
considered, and those that are finally chosen. (p. 127) 
The purpose of Etzioni’s model is to stay closer to the neoclassical model 
of economic decision-making than models of moral decision-making proposed by 
others (see Latane & Darley, 1970; Schwartz, 1970; Simmons, Klein & Simmons, 
1977). All of these theories assume that other emotional and value factors 
influence decision making, but Etzioni’s approach shares characteristics of 
Aristotle’s concept of hierarchy (Yuengert, 2000) with the N/A coming before the 
L/E. This differs from Bell (2011b) who allows the N/A and L/E to be present at 
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the same time or hierarchically.  
In Etzioni’s (1988) model the N/A factors influence decision-making by 
excluding options that never make it to L/E analysis (i.e. we don’t consider 
murdering our competition) or often excluding L/E considerations completely (i.e. 
we don’t go beyond N/A when deciding to donate a kidney to a family member). 
N/A factors also “load” facts with “interpretation, and inferences drawn with 
nonlogical and nonempirical ‘weights’…that ranks options in ways that differ 
from their L/E standing” (p.132). Anyone who has been “in love” has probably 
observed this in his or her own decision-making. 
Intrusion is another factor that often gives N/A factors prominence over 
L/E factors in Etzioni’s model. He states that “…L/E considerations require 
completing a sequence that involves collecting facts, interpreting their meanings, 
and drawing inferences leading one to favor one option over others” [emphasis in 
the original] (1988, p. 132). However, N/A factors can interrupt the L/E 
considerations causing individuals to skip steps, under analyze information, or 
inadequately complete them. Completing the sequence of L/E considerations 
requires a great deal of discipline, self-awareness, and a high level of attention 
and concentration. Similar to Simon’s (1991) concept of bounded rationality, the 
limitations of our cognitive processes cause us to take shortcuts or get tunnel 
vision leading to N/A factors taking over. This is consistent with the bounded 
rationality problems discussed by other scholars concerned with the behavioral 
aspects of decision-making (see Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; 
Posavac, Kardes, & Brakus, 2010; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). Etzioni (1988) 
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argues this occurs because “L/E thinking is conducted ‘vertically’, in sequences, 
[and] N/A ‘considerations’ [use] ‘lateral thinking’” (p.133). 
In short, Etzioni (1988) does not believe rationality is short-circuited in 
this N/A hierarchical model; it simply helps in the decision-making process. To 
put it in the language of Sen (1994) and Bell (2011b) N/A factors help establish a 
menu of choices by excluding options. These choices are then analyzed using L/E 
factors and a decision is made. Sometimes there can be negative consequences 
(i.e. tunnel vision or ineffective shortcuts), but overall serves as a positive method 
of meeting the multiple ‘nonrational’ needs of individual decision makers. 
Specifically the author views Pieters and Van Raaij’s (1987) four functions of 
affect as having positive impacts on decision-making. They include the 
interpretation and organization of information, the mobilization and allocation of 
resources, sensation seeking (when bored) and avoiding (when stressed), and by 
providing a means of communicating feelings and preferences. 
 
Behavioral Economics/Finance 
 
  The field of behavioral economics/finance is one area of decision-making that 
deserves consideration in the discussion of ‘nonrational’ economic decision-making 
models. This field deals with issues like biases (actor/observer, status quo, confirmation, 
not invented here, availability, and short-term), and individuals’ propensity to engage in 
herding behavior, use heuristics or rules of thumb, be overconfident, and a tendency to be 
loss averse (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). The authors suggest these biases can sometimes be 
overcome by choice architecture or “nudges” that move people toward the decision that is 
in their (rational) best interest. For example, to get people to save for retirement, 
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employers can set up defined contribution plans so that individuals must opt-out rather 
than opt-in to the plan as status quo biases lead people to keep the default option. Thaler 
(1988) has also explored the behavioral aspects of cooperation (as has Sen, 1977; 1994) 
in economic decision-making. 
 Becker (1968) has also done some interesting work in behavioral economics. He 
treated crime and punishment as a constrained optimization problem to minimize the 
social costs of crime. He found the optimal solution was to minimize monitoring or 
surveillance and maximize fines. How punishment structures are designed impacts 
decisions about the allocation of time between crime and legitimate employment. In other 
words, creating behavioral structures in which “crime does not pay” seems to have the 
greatest social benefit. This includes higher fines or greater punishment for crimes with 
lower elasticities. 
While Simon’s (1991) bounded rationality has previously been mentioned, 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory uses cognitive psychology to explain 
why rational decision-making (specifically expected utility theory) is not representative 
of how individuals make decisions under risk. Like Etzioni (1988), prospect theory is 
hierarchical in nature with people first editing and then evaluating based on utility. 
During the editing process individuals use a variety of means to “rank” the prospective 
decisions leaving them with a smaller set from which to choose. Unlike Etzioni, prospect 
theory does not necessarily insist emotions and values drive the editing process, although 
they may be a part of it. The theory also asserts that individuals are more likely to assign 
utility value based on loss aversion and relative gains. In other words, they try to 
minimize losses rather than maximize gains. Their decisions are also considered subject 
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to intransitivity as they are based on the relative preferences between pairs of options. 
This is different from the expected utility theory of rational decision-making models in 
which absolute wealth (or gain maximization) is the most important factor and it is 
assumed that all information is analyzed to reach the rational decision. Dan Ariely (2008) 
provides evidence in his book Predictably Irrational that supports many of the behavioral 
aspects discussed here. These include an individual’s propensity to regard their 
environment and decisions in terms of their relation to others, asymmetric dominance 
effects, anchoring, ignoring opportunity costs, and the role of social norms, emotions, 
expectations, and self-control in decision-making. 
 
Neuroeconomics  
 
The emerging field of neuroeconomics is attempting to determine all the different 
ways the brain drives decision-making. Neuroeconomics is combining behavioral 
economics with neuroscience, cognitive and social psychology, and other experimental 
methods to understand more about how individuals make economic decisions and how 
they inform the other decisions in our lives. The field seeks to determine what variables 
the brain computes to make economic decisions, how the underlying neurobiology helps 
and constrains decision-making, and how it improves the understanding of behavior and 
well-being in economic, political, clinical, legal, and business contexts among others 
(Dayan, 2008; Fehr & Rangel, 2011). 
 
Naturalistic Decision-Making 
 
 Another emerging field of decision-making is Naturalistic Decision-Making 
(NDM). NDM attempts to determine how people use their expertise and other factors in 
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actual decision-making as opposed to in a laboratory environment. It is primarily 
concerned with proficient decision makers with relevant experience or knowledge in the 
area in which they are making decisions. The need for “expertise” and observations in 
actual decision-making situations makes this method of inquiry unique. However, while 
the method is broad in its approach to factors leading to decisions, the need for expertise 
makes it a more narrowly focused inquiry as individuals often make decisions in areas in 
which they are not experts. In these cases the decision-making process might be quite 
different (Lipshitz et al., 2001). 
 The method is relevant to this discussion because the characteristics of decision-
making explored go beyond traditional rational methods. One characteristic is 
considering the cognitive processes of proficient decision makers. NDM also considers 
how well experts match decision actions with situations. For example, experts often 
quickly screen out most options by comparing them against a standard for the situation 
rather than compared to one another. This includes an analysis of an option’s 
compatibility with a decision-makers values, rather than just its relative merits (Beach, 
1990; Lipshitz et al., 2001). Unlike some other approaches, NDM also believes “that 
‘ought’ cannot be divorced from ‘is’: prescriptions which are optimal in some formal 
sense but which cannot be implemented are worthless” (Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & 
Salas, 2001, p.335). In other words, practical application is necessary to justify decision-
making theory. 
 
Other ‘Nonrational’ Theories and Models 
 
 The purpose of this portion of the literature review was to discuss the nonrational 
theories that attempt to overcome some of problems associated with assumptions of 
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rationality in economic (macro and micro) decision-making models. As the scope of this 
research does not allow for an in-depth discussion of all scholarly thought on nonrational 
theories, some of the theories/models that most closely align with existing classical, 
neoclassical, and contemporary economic thought have been highlighted. The goal is to 
add layers of analysis on top of rational decision-making models and consider options 
that will enhance existing theory.  
A second goal is to provide evidence of scholarly thought on the role of decision 
factors like values, emotions, learning, concern for others, culture, and the impact of 
individuals in economic decision-making. With that in mind, there are other decision-
making theories that have not been discussed in detail here, but may be drawn from in 
later analysis. Aspects of many of these theories can be seen in several of the models and 
theories already discussed.  
 
 
Final Thoughts On Value Inclusive Economic Decision-Making Models 
 
 While Bell’s (2011b) model draws heavily from the classical economic literature 
and even physics, the fields of ethics, psychology, behavioral economics/finance, 
neuroeconomics, and naturalistic decision-making all offer insights into the ‘nonrational’ 
models of economic decision-making. We see recurring themes of relativity, complex 
systems, concern for others, bounded rationality, behavioral factors, natural or organic 
models, and a lack of dichotomy between the positive/normative and fact/value (although 
distinction remains applicable at times). 
 Assuming a role for values in economic decision-making, the following section 
explores two questions:  
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1) How are individual values that go into our microeconomic decision-making 
formed? 
2)  In what ways do we apply those values in microeconomic organizational 
decisions?  
 
Value-Inclusive Microeconomic Decision-Making 
 
 
 If we are going to understand the role of values in microeconomic decision-
making, it will be necessary to explore how values are developed and how they might be 
relevant in the business environment. In this section some notable theories associated 
with the development of individual values will be discussed. In addition, studies that 
indicate how personal values impact organizational decision-making at the 
microeconomic level will be considered in the final portion of the literature review. 
 
Individual Value Development 
 
 
 To be inclusive of values in economic decision-making, it will be necessary to 
define individual values and how they are formed. Rokeach (1968) defines values, “as 
abstract ideals, positive or negative, not tied to any specific object or situation, 
representing a person’s beliefs about modes of conduct…” (p. 124). He believes these 
values guide individual actions. Personal values are those values that an individual is 
committed to and that influence behavior and guide the actions of the individual (Kaushal 
& Janjhua, 2011; Theordoron & Achilles, 1969). Consistent with Bell’s (2011b), 
Etzioni’s (1988), Huei-Chun Su’s (2010), and Subramaniam’s (1963), and models 
described above, Shalom H. Schwartz (1992) views values as criteria in decision-making 
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(to both select and justify actions) and not just descriptions inherent in individuals. 
People use values to “select and justify actions and to evaluate people (including the self) 
and events” (Schwartz, 1992, p.1). He has also demonstrated that values can be impacted 
by social structure like education, age, gender and occupation as well as unique life 
experiences. Personal values influence individual’s ideologies, attitudes, and actions 
across cultures. 
 
Kohlberg and Value Development 
 
 Lawrence Kohlberg has conducted extensive research on whether the moral 
values of individuals have the ability to develop over time. Based on his research, he 
developed what he describes as “a culturally universal invariant sequence of stages of 
moral development” (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 630). His model consists of six stages within 
three levels of development  
The following is adapted from Kohlberg’s (1973) description of the model: 
I. Preconventional level 
At this level an individual is concerned with cultural rules, good and bad, right or 
wrong. Individuals associate these rules and labels in terms of consequences like 
punishment, reward, or exchange of favor. 
Stage 1 is a punishment-and-obedience orientation. Individuals are not concerned with 
their own meaning of value, but obey to avoid unpleasant consequences. 
Stage 2 is the instrumental-relativist orientation. In this stage individuals take actions 
that satisfy their own needs while occasionally satisfying the needs of others. 
Reciprocity is simply a way to ensure you can continue to get what you want. The 
concept of fairness comes into play, but only in a very pragmatic way. For example, a 
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child might want to make sure his sister is not getting a bigger piece of cake than he is. 
II. Conventional Level 
At this level individuals become concerned with maintaining the expectations of their 
family, group, or nation. These expectations are considered valuable on their own and 
are considered by choice rather than out of concern for consequences. Individuals 
desire to maintain, support, and justify the order of the group. The do not desire to 
simply conform, but wish to identify with the group. 
Stage 3 is referred to as the interpersonal concordance or “good boy—nice girl” 
orientation. Individuals become aware that good behavior is what pleases others and is 
approved by them. Individuals will try to conform to their perceived stereotypes of the 
group. You earn approval by being nice and behavior is often judged by intention. 
Stage 4 is the “law and order” stage. Maintaining the social order through authority and 
fixed rules is important. The correct way to maintain social order in this stage is 
through doing one’s duty and showing respect for authority for its own sake. 
III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level 
At this level individuals have formed their own moral values and principles. These 
values and principles are not a part of the individual’s identification with the group, but 
stand on their own validity. 
Stage 5 is the social-contract legalistic orientation. This orientation generally comes 
with utilitarian overtones. Right actions are framed within the context of individual 
rights and standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the society 
as a whole. The relativism of personal values and opinions is recognized and 
procedures for reaching consensus are established. The American government and 
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constitution are based on this form of morality as rational considerations of social 
utility are applied that not only emphasize the legal point of view, but also the 
possibility of changing the law. This is different from Stage 4 where the rules are fixed. 
Stage 6 is the universal-ethical-principle orientation. At this stage universal principles 
of justice, the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and respect for the dignity of 
people as individuals become guiding, self-chosen principles. The rules that guide the 
individual are abstract and ethical, and not absolute.  
 Kohlberg (1973) argues that not only does our morality develop over time, but our 
logic does as well. He describes this as a transformational process that makes us better 
decision-makers over time. The theory shares the hierarchical characteristics of the 
models of decision-making described earlier (Rest, 1973). His final stage is closely 
aligned with the theory of justice as described by John Rawls (1971). Kohlberg’s model 
seeks to use an interdisciplinary approach that fuses the theories of moral philosophy set 
forth by Rawls and Jean Piaget (Rest et al., 2000). It combines the inherent morality and 
justice seeking of Rawls (1971) with the genetic epistemology approach of Piaget that 
assumes the development of moral judgment with age (Piaget, 1932/1997).  
 
 
The Neo-Kohlbergian Perspective 
 
While some scholars agree with Kohlberg’s approach, there were many who do 
not. As a result, a Neo-Kohlbergian perspective emerged. Bebeau, Narvaez, Rest, & 
Thoma (1999) believed Kohlberg’s theory had merit, but required some modifications. 
They believed several of Kohlberg’s core ideas required revisiting; specifically his 
emphasis on cognition, individuals self-constructing categories of morality (like justice, 
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duty, rights and social order), that one set of moral concepts was more developed and 
“better” than others, and the “macromoral” focus on the formal structures of society in 
the form of laws, roles, institutions, and general practices. 
The authors first propose a distinction between and recognition of macromorality 
(as described above) and micromorality that deals with personal interactions, how we 
treat people, and “generally acting in a decent, responsible, empathic way in one’s daily 
dealings with others” (Bebeau, et al., 1999, p. 2). They further describe the distinction 
between macromorality and micromorality as follows: 
In micromoral issues, what is praiseworthy is characterized in terms of 
unswerving loyalty, dedication, and partisan caring to special others…in 
macormorality, the praiseworthy response is characterized in terms of 
impartiality and acting on principle, instead of partisanship, favoritism, or 
tribalism. Both macro- and micromorality concern ways of constructing 
and enriching the web of relationship’s—one through the structures of 
society, and the other through personal face-to-face relationships. (p. 3) 
 While Bebeau, et al. (1999) see room for both micro- and macromorality to 
coexist, they believe both Kohlberg and the Neo-Kohlbergian approach are better at 
measuring the macromoral. This is consistent with J. N. Keynes (1917) and J. M. Keynes 
(1936) need to isolate macro factors from micro factors for ease of analysis in economic 
decision-making. This is a limitation of both approaches because it requires a high level 
of abstract thinking that doesn’t apply well to individual decisions. Most individuals 
don’t engage in abstract, philosophical thought prior to making a decision. Factors like 
personal and immediate group values, relationships, emotions, behavioral, and other 
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‘non-rational’ factors as described in the economic decision-making models in this paper 
demonstrate the more unconscious and automatic processes individuals utilize. 
Naturalistic decision-making research supports Bebeau’s assertions as it has finds the 
complexity of the decision-making process under uncertainty causes us to match 
responses to cues from the situation or environment that often rely on informal reasoning. 
Neo-Kohlbergians also recognize the potential for conflict between the micro- and 
macromoral considerations and therefore justify the macromoral limitation as preferable 
because the ultimate goal should be for the betterment of society through impartiality, 
fairness, and justice. As a result the Neo-Kohlbergian approach carries forward the 
Rawlian characteristics of the original theory. Bell’s (2011b) approach to economic 
decision-making attempts to combine the micro and macro into one model that 
incorporates both. In her model the values ether both shapes and is shaped by both micro- 
and macro-level values with the superadditivity of micro-level values influencing and 
being influenced by the macro-level. 
 The Neo-Kohlbergian perspective also argues against a stair-step approach to 
moral development as proposed by Kohlberg (1971) and Piaget (1932/1997). Instead they 
argue for gradual shifting toward the use of higher forms of thinking that are not tied in to 
age or hard stages of development. They also reject the notion that advanced moral 
thinking is the exclusive result of individual cognitions uninfluenced by other people and 
society. However, it does retain the assumption of rationality (Narvaez, 2005). Bell’s 
(2011b) model is consistent with this approach as it attempts to incorporate factors like 
relationships and cooperation as presented by Sen (1994; 2004) as well as society, but 
does remove the assumption of rationality in its classic definition of purely self-interested 
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utility maximization based on cost/benefit analysis. Instead rationality includes multiple 
interests including commitment that make multiple decisions equally rational, but for 
different reasons for different people (Bell, 2011b; Sen, 2005). 
 To replace stage theory, Bebeau, et al. (1999) use schema theory to determine 
moral development. They use the Defining Issues Test (DIT) to activate and assess moral 
judgment. The purpose is to determine which schemas an individual brings to a task 
when making a decision. While they do not fit neatly into “stages” they do determine 
what set of schemas an individual is using in decision-making. This set of schemas has 
proven effective in determining the level of moral thinking an individual is using 
(Narvaez, 2005; Rest et al., 2000). These schemas already exist in the individual’s head 
or long term memory and are presumed to structure and guide people’s moral thinking 
(Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). This shift from stage theory to schema theory 
is the most significant contribution of the Neo-Kohlbergian school and attempts to bridge 
the gap between cognitive science and moral psychology. It also seeks to move the theory 
beyond the exclusive moral judgment approach of Kohlberg and incorporate moral 
sensitivity, moral motivation, and moral action (Narvaez, 2005). 
 
Social Learning Theory 
 
 The concept of social learning theory could easily have been included in the 
decision-making models and theories portion of this paper as well as this section on how 
individual values are formed. I have chosen to put it here as Bandura (Bandura, 1977; 
Wood & Bandura, 1989) first considers how values are formed and then how they are 
utilized. Applications of the theory will be described in more detail in the following 
section. Social learning theory was developed by Albert Bandura (see Bandura, 1977) in 
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response to what he saw as shortcomings in Miller and Dollard’s (1941) concepts of 
modeling in Social Learning and Imitation. Bandura (2007) summarizes Miller and 
Dollard’s concept of modeling as follows: “A model provides a social cue, the observer 
performs a matching response, and its reinforcement strengthens the tendency to behave 
imitatively” (p. 55). His concern was that in real life we don’t simply mimic specific acts 
or wholly incorporate the personality patterns of another person (the model). Instead, he 
saw observational learning as selectively and conditionally manifesting characteristics of 
the model. He saw the process of social modeling as having a cognitive component and 
not simply mirroring others (Bandura, 2007). He also rejected the traditional assumptions 
of behaviorists, which emphasize environmental determinism and minimize the 
contributions of cognitive processes, especially cognitive mediators (Kytle, 1978). In 
terms of values development, this makes it possible to cognitively reject the values of 
your parents and selectively adopt the values you observe (and like) in others.  
 Bandura rejects the notion of human behavior being explained in terms of one-
sided determinism. He believes individuals learn within a social context, this includes 
their values and beliefs about themselves and others (Bandura, 1977; Wood & Bandura, 
1989). Rather than one-sided determinism, he proposes a triadic reciprocal determinist 
approach for how we learn values and behaviors and achieve behavioral changes. In his 
model of social learning theory, behavior, personal factors including cognition, and the 
external environment “operate as interacting determinants that influence each other 
bidirectionally…Because of the bidirectionality of influence, people are both product and 
producers of their environments (Wood & Bandura, 1989, p. 362). This concept is similar 
to Bell’s (2011b) model of the values ether in which current and past decisions, learning, 
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relationships, and cooperation all influence each other bidirectionally, both influencing 
and being influenced by one another. Like Bell, change and context become part of the 
determinants of the description and explanation of how values are formed within 
Bandura’s social learning theory (Lerner, 1990). 
 Social learning theory is based on the premise that information is conveyed by 
models through direct observation called observational learning. In order for 
observational learning to occur, four processes must be present: 
1) Attentional processes—Attention determines what people selectively observe and 
what information they extract from the modeled activity. 
2) Cognititive representational processes—This is the process of actively retaining 
information by transforming the observation into rules and conceptions. 
3) Behavioral production process—In this process the rules and conceptions 
previously determined are translated into courses of action. 
4) Motivational processes—There are three primary types of motivators: 
a. Direct—The action will produce valued outcomes. 
b. Vicarious—People can be motivated by the successes of others who are 
similar to themselves. 
c. Self-produced—People generate self-evaluations that regulate which 
observationally learned actions they will choose. Values and values 
formation can be a significant influence in this area (Wood & Bandura, 
1989). 
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 The social contexts and observational learning processes described by Bandera 
can certainly influence individual value development. Individuals can also influence the 
value of others through value modeling.  
 
Final Thoughts on Individual Value Development 
 The three perspectives discussed here describing how individual values are 
formed have several differences. Kohlberg’s approach is based on inherent morality and 
the genetic epistemology of moral development that incorporates a significant role for 
individual cognition. The Neo-Kohlbergian perspective seeks to add incorporate moral 
sensitivity, moral motivation, and moral action to Kohlberg’s approach. The Neo-
Kohlbergian school also recognizes that micro-moral factors are present and may conflict 
with macro-moral factors, yet continues to evaluate the issue from a macro perspective 
for ease of analysis as the good of society is viewed as the primary interest. The stair-step 
approach to development, not recognizing the potential impact of micro-moral issues, and 
one set of moral concepts being better than another are rejected and the roles of 
individual cognition and self-constructing of morality are minimized in favor of a 
“schema” approach in Neo-Kolberianism. While not specifically analyzed, the influences 
of other people and society are recognized (Bebeau et al., 1999;  Narvaez, 2005; Rest et 
al., 2000).  
 Bandura’s (1977; Wood & Bandura, 1989) social learning theory sees a much 
more active role for social context, learning, change, and observation resulting in a 
cognitive process of selectively and conditionally adopting values within the value 
development process. Bandura’s approach is similar to Schwartz (1970; 1992) who 
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incorporates social structures like education, age, gender and occupation as well as 
unique life experiences into the process of value development. These approaches are 
much more holistic in their approach. 
 Bell’s (2011b) model more closely aligns with the approaches to value inclusive 
decision-making and the formation of values suggested by Bandura (1977) and Schwartz 
(1970; 1992). Bell’s model is based on the bidirectional influence of individuals and 
society including concern for factors like relationships, cooperation, experience, 
information, learning, complexity, and multiple equilibria. There is also a place for the 
Neo-Kohlbergian (Bebeau et al., 1999, Narvaez, 2005; Rest et al, 2000) concept of 
schemas in Bell’s model, but she would argue that there are both micro and macro 
influences on those schemas, which may evolve over time. Overlaying the Neo-
Kohlbergian and social learning approaches of value development with Bell’s (2011b) 
model would result in the following revised model in Figure 2.3on the following page. 
Even with their differences, there are some core similarities between the theories 
of moral development. The first similarity is that morality and values do have a role in 
decision-making and they do evolve over time. A second similarity is the involvement of 
others either in our concern for others in our decision-making or the influences of others. 
Even Kohlberg’s approach that is based strongly on an internal cognitive approach to 
development does include the influence of others. For example, even in the Level 1, 
Stage 1 punishment-and-obedience orientation, someone else is determining what is right, 
what is wrong, and when an individual should be punished or rewarded. 
 
 
VALUES IN MICROECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING 55 
Figure 2.3. Bell’s ‘New Science’ Value-Inclusive Model of Economic Decision-Making 
With Neo-Kohlbergian & Social Learning Values Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Value-Inclusive Microeconomic Decision-Making in Organizations 
 
 
 If values are included in economic decision-making and individual values are 
formed in a variety of ways, why should businesses and other organizations be concerned 
with values? The most obvious reason is that individuals in organizations make 
microeconomic decisions that can impact the entire organization. The values of 
individuals in organizations can determine the values of organizations including the 
ethical practices that make or break them. The ethics scandals that rocked companies like 
Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom all involved the personal values of individuals within these 
companies (McLean & Elkind, 2004). Behavior in an organization is a manifestation of 
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attitudes and values. If behaviors and their actions are manifestations of values, then 
values are both inferred from behavior and may predict behavior in organizations 
(Churchman, 1961; Connor & Becker, 1975; England, 1967).  
 Studies have indicated that individuals may bring the personal values they use 
routinely, to their decisions at work. Personal values that closely match organizational 
values result in greater organizational commitment and are linked to variables like 
absenteeism, turnover, job satisfaction, organizational citizenship, and job performance 
(Finegan, 2000). In addition to organizational commitment, worker satisfaction is greater 
when their values are congruent with those of their immediate supervisor (Jiang, Lin, & 
Lin, 2010; Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1989) . Values can also impact vocational choice 
and the likelihood of rising to a leadership position (Finegan, 2000; Keltner, Langner, & 
Allison, 2006; Palmer, 2000). Individual value characteristics like conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, neuroticism, Machiavellianism, moral reasoning, and locus of control 
along with moderating influences like the need for power and moral utilization all 
influence ethical leadership (Brown & Trevino, 2006). Values are the “prime drivers of 
personal, social, and professional choices” (Suar & Khuntia, 2010, p. 443). 
 Cultural and work contexts can also impact values and their use in business 
decisions (Gamble & Gibson, 1999; Suar & Khuntia, 2010). Gamble and Gibson (1999) 
found that the personal/cultural value of collectivism based on personal relationships 
manifests itself at work with Chinese financial controllers. When making business 
decisions, they did not attempt to meet objective performance criteria, but instead used 
‘relationships’ and ‘organization’ considerations in decision-making. Cooperating with 
peers and supporting supervisors had significant weight in decision-making. Work values 
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emerge from personal values because work values emerge from the projection of personal 
values into the domain of work (Kaushal & Janjhua, 2011; Ros, Schwartz, & Surkis, 
1999). 
 As important as value congruence is to organizational commitment and individual 
performance, personal values also determine ethical practices at work. As Suar & 
Khuntia (2010) state: 
Irrespective of the type of organizations and age of managers, personal 
values more potently and consistently decreased unethical practices and 
increased work behavior compared to value congruence. Hiring managers 
emphasizing personal values can demote unethical practices and promote 
work behavior. (p. 443) 
 If we assume that Bandura (1977) is correct and individuals continue to develop 
contextual values based on observational learning, organizational leaders are pivotal in 
ensuring the ethical practices in business decision-making of subordinates. Leaders who 
articulate their values and model ethical behavior can reduce unethical behavior and 
interpersonal conflicts (Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012), make ethical 
behaviors by subordinates a habit (Almeida, 2011), positively impact the personal values 
of employees (Weiss, 1978), create more value for customers through market orientation 
(Lam, Kraus, & Ahearne, 2010), and demonstrate justice and care during a corporate 
crisis (Simola, 2003). They help form the complex mental models that all members of the 
organization use in the decision-making process (Courtney, 2001; Goel, Johnson, 
Junglas, & Ives, 2010) and influence the meanings individuals give to experiences in the 
sensemaking process in organizations (Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). 
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Of course this is a double edged sword and leaders like John Gutfreund at 
Salomon Brothers and Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling at Enron who express negative values 
and model unethical behavior will most likely lead observers to either leave the company 
or adopt the unethical practices embedded in the culture (Sims & Brinkmann, 2002; 
McLean & Elkind, 2004). As a result, organizations have a vested interest in 
understanding the role of values in organizational decision-making and how those values 
and the resulting behaviors are formed. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Methods 
 
 
 The purpose of this study was to identify the relationships between the personal 
values that individuals in a group assign to decision considerations and the future 
decisions of those individual group members. The role reflecting on and sharing values 
plays in our development of decision-making schemas, and whether these factors can 
interrupt existing, unconscious decision-making schemas will be explored. A quasi-
experimental pretest/posttest design with 5 groups was utilized. A quasi-experimental 
design that includes multiple groups was selected to minimize certain internal validity 
threats to single group models including history, maturation, selection, mortality, and 
experimenter biases. The design of the experiment also helped minimize some of these 
threats. For example, the history, maturation, and mortality threats were minimized 
because the pretest, treatment, and posttest all occurred during the same class period over 
approximately 1 1/2 hours. 
 
Sample 
 
 Participants were selected using convenience sampling from 5 undergraduate 
business classes with 3 at the Mat-Su College of the University of Alaska Anchorage 
(MSC) and 2 at Colorado State University (CSU). The MSC groups were between 13 and 
22 students and the 2 CSU groups ranged from 35 to 45 students. While convenience 
sampling was utilized to choose the classes to participate, the students had randomly self-
selected to enroll in the programs and courses with no influence from the researcher. 
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These two campuses provide very different environments and student populations. 
CSU is a large research university with approximately 23,000 students in Fort Collins, 
CO (U.S. News & World Report, 2013). While not an “urban” campus the population of 
the city is approximately 147,000 and the city website describes Fort Collins as “rapidly 
urbanizing”. CSU is also a “selective” college (75.9% accepted) with specific and 
rigorous admission requirements that must be met by all students.  
MSC is a small satellite “teaching” campus of the University of Alaska 
Anchorage with a 2012/2013 academic year student population of approximately 1,900. 
The campus is located on the border of the towns of Palmer and Wasilla, Alaska that 
have a combined population of approximately 14,214. MSC draws students from the 
greater Mat-Su Borough with a population of approximately 92,000 in an area the size of 
the state of West Virginia. The campus offers Associate Degrees and coursework leading 
to Bachelor’s degrees at the University of Alaska Anchorage. MSC is an “open 
enrollment” campus meaning there are no admission requirements other than taking the 
university placement tests for math and English. Of those students enrolled in the 
College, approximately 25% do not have college level math or English skills and are 
required to take developmental classes.  
 One reason for choosing classes is that Bell’s (2011b) model and other scholars 
including Bandura (1977) and Sen (1994) suggest relationships may play a role in the 
formation of values. Students in the same class have had an opportunity to form 
relationships and ideas about one another that would be lost if the class members had 
been separated and randomly assigned to groups. While this is only one type of 
relationship, it serves as a control for this study and does not necessarily limit 
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generalizability. Members of a class have a variety of levels of “closeness” with other 
individuals in the class as we all do with the individuals we encounter on a daily basis. 
This study is not designed to test level of relationship, only to choose groups in which 
some relationship exists. Classes have the added benefit of being similar to work groups 
in the business environment, which is the intended application of this study. 
 All subjects were adults and no members of vulnerable populations were utilized. 
 
Instrumentation 
 
 Participants were given the Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT2) as the pretest and 
posttest. This test was originally developed by James R. Rest (1979) and later updated 
and revised in the second version used here. Scored results are based on Kohlberg’s 
(1973) Stages of Moral Development, but it is designed to test the unconscious schemas 
consistent with the Neo-Kohlbergian perspective. The instrument has been used in over 
400 published articles (Center for the Study of Ethical Development, 2012) many times 
with university students (Cesur, S. & Topcu, M. S., 2010; Lies, J. M., Bock, T., 
Brandenberger, J., & Trozzolo, T. A., 2012; Pagano & DeBono, 2011; Woodward, Davis, 
& Hodis, 2007) including at least one study specifically using business students (Lan, 
Gowing, McMahon, Rieger & King, 2008). The DIT has proven to be very reliable with 
Cronbach’s alpha ranging from the upper 0.70s to the low 0.80s over 25 years of data. 
Test-retest results without interventions have proven to be about the same (Rest et al., 
2000). An example of the pre-test and post-test instrument are in Appendices A and B of 
this document. 
Participants were also given a list of values and anti-values to serve as prompts. 
The value prompts were adapted from Schwartz’s (1992) list of universal values and 
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motivational types of values. Schwartz’s values list was modified to include opposite 
pairs or value/anti-value pairs (See Appendix C). For example, one of Schwartz values 
was honesty; the value prompts for this study includes the matched pair of 
honesty/dishonesty. The reason for this modification is that when participants are asked 
to select a personal value they believe applies to a particular decision consideration, the 
decision consideration might indicate a lack of the value of honesty. For example, if one 
of the decision considerations participants are asked to assign a value to is: “To prevent 
going to jail, I would lie,” this may indicate a lack of the honesty value. In this case the 
value I might associate with this decision consideration is the anti-value of dishonesty. 
Anti-values were developed from antonyms in The Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Thesaurus (2
nd
 ed.). 
Demographic information was collected including age, gender, time in business 
cohort, years of full-time/part-time work experience outside the university, and number 
of years in a leadership position in full-time/part-time work.  
Students were also asked about their perceived use of values and ethical decision-
making skills to determine their self-expectations. These questions were important 
because expectations of self and others have been considered as possible motivations for 
decision-making. While, this study explores whether the reflection on and sharing of 
values impacts an individual’s decision-making, it is also important to capture self-
expectations about how individuals make decisions for future analysis. The two questions 
that were asked included: 
1. Do you consider your personal values when making work decisions? 
Yes/No 
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2. Do you consider yourself an ethical decision maker? Yes/No 
 
Experimental Design and Procedures. 
 
Design.  As previously discussed this quasi-experimental study will use a 
pretest/posttest design with multiple groups.  While participants will not be randomly 
assigned to groups students have randomly self-selected to be in the class and were not 
placed in groups by the researcher.  The experiment also requires students to be part of a 
group or community within which they may have developed relationships.  Using the 
standard classic notation system the quasi-experimental design is as follows: 
Test Groups:  O----------X----------O 
Pretest. During the pretest, participants will be given the Defining Issues Test-2. 
The researcher will give instructions and offer to answer any questions.  
Treatment. The researcher will distribute the list of value/anti-value prompts and 
give participants an opportunity to read the list and ask any clarifying questions. If 
students ask questions about what a particular value means, the researcher will provide a 
definition. All definitions of values will come directly from Schwartz’s (1992) definitions 
included in his list on pages 61-62 of his study. Anti-value definitions will come from 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed. (2008).  
A list of the decision considerations participants were asked to rate in scenario 1 
was distributed (See Appendix D). Participants were asked to assign the value they 
believe most adequately reflected the personal value of an individual who would consider 
that issue to be assigned “great” or “much” importance in the decision for that scenario. 
Participant’s answers were collected and the researcher projected a word 
document on the screen with each of the decision considerations from scenario 1. With 
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the group, the researcher randomly selected 5 to 13 response sheets from students and 
added the values the participants assigned to each of the decision considerations, creating 
a values set for each issue. No discussion was allowed, but participants were given a few 
minutes to review the information. 
Posttest. The participants will retake all parts of the Defining Issues Test-2. 
 
Pilot Test 
 
The process and instruments were piloted tested with 30 undergraduate students 
in an Introduction to Business class at the University of Alaska Anchorage, Mat-Su 
Campus. Students found the DIT2 easy to understand, but somewhat time consuming. 
The students also found the Value Prompts understandable and relevant to the decision 
considerations. They had no additional suggestions for how instructions or the 
instruments could be improved.  
The original method called for all students’ responses to the values expressed on 
Scenario 1 to be shared with the group. I found it to be very time consuming during the 
pilot and noticed students starting to lose interest after awhile. As a result, I decided to 
pull a random sample of 10 to share. The pilot took approximately 1½ hours, but I 
believed I could reduce the time by 15 minutes with this modification. The time reduction 
proved to be true for all but 1 of the participating groups. 
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Data Analysis 
 
 As the DIT2 is a proprietary instrument owned by the University of Alabama, 
responses were sent to UofA for scoring. The test results provided the following scores in 
Table 2 on the following page. I completed statistical data analysis by group, school, and 
for the data as a whole.  
Table 3.1 
 
DIT-2 Measured Scores 
 
Stage 23 Score Personal Interest Schema Score: this score represents the proportion 
of items selected that represents considerations from Stage 2 (focus on 
the personal interest of the actor making the moral decisions) and Stage 
3 (focus on maintaining friendships, good relationships, and approval). 
Stage 4P Score Maintaining Norms Schema Score: this score represents the 
proportion of items selected that represent consideration from Stage 4 
(focus on maintaining the existing legal system, roles, and formal 
organizational structure). 
P Score Postconventional Schema Score: this score represents the proportion 
of items selected that represent considerations from Stage 5 (focus on 
appealing to majority while maintaining minority rights) and Stage 6 
(focus on appealing to intuitive moral principles or ideals). 
N2 Score New Index Score: this score represents the degree to which 
Postconventional items are prioritized plus the degree to which 
Personal interest items receive lower ratings than the Postconventional 
items. This score is adjusted to have the same mean and standard 
deviation as the P score to allow for comparisons. 
U Score Utilizer Score: This score represents the degree of match between 
which items the participants rated as most important and what decision 
participants say they would make in the moral dilemma. 
Hum/Lib Score Humanitarian/Liberalism Score: this score represents the number of 
reported decisions for the moral dilemmas that match those chosen by a 
group of “experts” (professionals in the field of political science and 
philosophy). Scores range from 0 to 5 out of the possible 5 moral 
dilemma decisions that can match. 
Cancer10 
Score 
Religious Orthodoxy Score: this score represents the sum of the rated 
importance and rank for one specific item from the Cancer moral 
dilemma that evokes the notion that only God can determine whether or 
not someone should live or die. 
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A Score Antisocial Score: this score represents the degree to which items are 
selected that represents considerations that reflect an anti-establishment 
attitude. These considerations presuppose Stage 4, but fault the 
establishment for being inconsistent with their purpose. 
M Score Meaningless Score: this score represents the degree to which the 
survey results are meaningless. The higher the score the more 
meaningless the individual survey results. 
Note. Adapted from “Defining Issues Test-2: Spring 2009,” by Texas Tech University, 2009, 
Retrieved from www.depts.ttu.edu/provost/qep/docs/DIT_Spring2009.pdf 
 
The total respondents and number of valid responses were recorded. M scores 
were checked and the scorer removed participants with high M scores from the study. M 
scores measure the meaningless items and are a test for response validity. Bebeau and 
Thoma (2003) describe these items as: 
…items that contain unusual, pretentious words or complex syntax, but the 
items aren’t meaningful to the dilemma. “M” items are ‘high sounding’ 
but deliberately designed to be meaningless. If a subject endorses too 
many of these items (greater than 10), we assume that the subject is 
responding to style of wording and syntax rather than to meaning, and 
therefore we invalidate the protocol. (p. 7) 
To determine if a change has occurred in the level of ethical decision-making 
utilizing the DIT2, the relevant scores to consider are the P Score and the N2 Score. I also 
included analysis of the Utilizer score as it has relevance to this study.  While not 
relevant to the study, I did analyze the results from Stage 23 and Stage 4P to look for any 
anomalies or inconsistencies with the instrument norms. I found the pre- and post test 
scores to be nearly identical with no statistically significant changes or unusual scores. 
Descriptive statistics including mean, median, mode, skewness, and standard deviation 
were calculated for both the pre- and posttest data. A t-Test (95% C.L.), and Pearson 
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correlation were calculated and reported here for matched pairs of the Postconventional, 
N2, and Utilizer scores.  
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Chapter 4 
Results 
 
 The primary purpose of this research is to explore the role reflecting on and 
sharing values plays in our individual decision-making schemas in groups. Specifically to 
answer the question: Can introducing values into decision considerations disrupt existing 
unconscious schemas? To accomplish this goal, the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT2) was 
used. It measures the unconscious values schemas individuals use in their decision-
making that determine their level of ethical decision-making. It is important to note that 
participants were not told the instrument measured ethical decision-making. They were 
simply told the instrument measured how they make decisions. The brief activity in 
which they were asked to determine the values associated with the decision 
considerations in Scenario 1 was the first time a values frame was introduced in the 
decision-making process.  
There were a total of 135 participants in the experiments with 107 (79.26%) 
complete matched pretest/posttest sets after scoring. Participants were removed from the 
study if they did not have completed pre- or posttests, including incomplete demographic 
information required by the scorer, or if they had “meaningless” scores higher than 10. A 
significant portion of the participants removed from the study came from Group 4. The 
group originally had 45 participants, but had 21 (47%) of participants removed due to one 
of the reasons discussed above. Group 4 was unique in that the class period was only 50 
minutes in length, whereas other groups used 1 1/4 to 1 1/2 hours to complete the 
experiment. For many participants, 50 minutes was not enough time to complete the 
experiment adequately as they had other classes to attend across a very large land grant 
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university. However, some students did stay after the 50-minute class period to complete 
their posttest. Incomplete or meaningless posttests were the primary reason for rejecting 
participant responses in this case. This was not a reflection of the method, but the time 
limitation available for participants.  
All participants described themselves as ethical decision-makers, and only 3 
participants reported they did not use their personal values when making work decisions. 
No one was allowed to participate more than once even if they were in more than one of 
the classes utilized. The experiment was conducted 5 times and information about the 
groups is described below.  
For those reporting demographic information for all participants the age range 
was from 18 to 50 with a mean age of 24.5, median of 22, and a mode of 21. Sixty-five 
(62%) participants were female and 40 (38%) were male. Seventy-four (71%) students 
are “traditional” college age students (18 – 24) and 31 (30%) are “nontraditional” college 
age students (25+). Of the scored participants reporting, 34 report a management major, 
16 accounting majors, 13 dual majors in management and marketing, 8 hospitality 
management majors, 4 computer science majors, 3 nursing majors, 3 logistics and supply 
chain management majors, 3 marketing majors, 3 organization and innovation majors, 2 
mechanical engineering majors, 2 dual majors in management and accounting, 2 
computer information systems majors, and 1 major each in human resources, computer 
information and office systems, human services, dental hygiene, business and music, 
accounting and global logistics management, management and finance, management and 
entrepreneurship, management and human resources, management and interior design, 
and management and equine science. 
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Group Descriptions - UAA Mat-Su College 
 
Group 1 
 This group was a MSC lower division Microeconomics class and consisted of 13 
participants resulting in 11 (85%) complete scored matched pretest/posttest pairs. 
Computer problems during the completion of either a pre- or posttest resulted in 
incomplete results in both cases. All scored participants are female, 2 are non-U.S. 
citizens and 3 are non-native English speakers. Ages of the group range from 19 to 45 
with a mean age of 27.36, median of 27, and a mode of 19. Five students (45%) are 
“traditional” college age students (18-24) and 6 (55%) are “nontraditional” college age 
students (25+). Of the scored participants reporting, 7 are accounting majors, 3 business 
administration majors, and one mechanical engineering major. 
The distribution of students reporting length of time as part of the cohort is on Table 4.1 
on page 74 
Due to the small class size, rather than taking a random sample of the values 
students assigned to each of the decision considerations in Scenario 1, all student 
responses were shared. The shared value set for each of the Scenario 1 decision 
considerations for all groups is in Appendix E. Duplicate responses were removed from 
the set.  
Group 2 
 
This group was a MSC lower division second semester Principles of Financial 
Accounting class and consisted of 20 participants resulting in 20 (100%) complete scored 
matched pretest/posttest pairs. Five scored participants are male and 15 are female, all are 
VALUES IN MICROECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING 71 
U.S. citizens and native English speakers. Ages of the group range from 18 to 48 with a 
mean age of 29.3, median of 27, and a mode of 26. Five students (25%) are “traditional” 
college age students (18-24) and 15 (75%) are “nontraditional” college age students 
(25+). Of the scored participants reporting, 9 are accounting majors, 8 are business 
administration/management majors, 1 human resources major, 1 computer information 
and office systems/office administration major, 1 nursing major, and 1 double major in 
accounting and global logistics management. The distribution of students reporting length 
of time as part of the cohort is on Table 4.1 on page 74. 
 For this class a random sample of 10 student responses to the values students 
assigned to each of the decision considerations in Scenario 1 were shared. Duplicate 
responses were removed from the set. 
 
Group 3 
 This group was a MSC lower division Supervision class and consisted of 19 
participants resulting in 17 (89%) complete scored matched pretest/posttest pairs. Eleven 
scored participants are male and 6 are female, all are U.S. citizens and 1 is a non-native 
English speaker. For those reporting (16), ages of the group range from 19 to 50 with a 
mean age of 25.93, median of 23.5, and a mode of 22. Eight students (50%) are 
“traditional” college age students (18-24) and 8 (50%) are “nontraditional” college age 
students (25+). Of the scored participants reporting, 4 are computer science majors, 3 
logistics and supply chain management majors, 2 business management majors, 2 nursing 
majors, 2 undecided, 1 human service major, 1 dental hygiene major, and 1 dual business 
and music major. The distribution of students reporting length of time as part of the 
cohort is on Table 4.1 on page 74. 
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For this class a random sample of 5 student responses to the values students 
assigned to each of the decision considerations in Scenario 1 were shared. Due to the time 
constraints experienced with Groups 4 and 5 at CSU, a sample of 5 student responses was 
chosen for those groups. I decided to choose only 5 from this group as well for 
consistency with the CSU groups. Doing so still provided a variety of responses (see 
Appendix E). Duplicate responses were removed from the set. 
 
Group Descriptions - Colorado State University 
Group 4 
 This group was a CSU upper division Human Resources class and consisted of 45 
participants resulting in 24 (53%) complete scored matched pretest/posttest pairs. Of 
those scored participants reporting (22), 10 are male and 12 are female, 1 is not a U.S. 
citizens and 1 is a non-native English speaker. For those reporting (16), ages of the group 
range from 20 to 36 with a mean age of 22.09, median of 21, and a mode of 21. Twenty 
students (91%) are “traditional” college age students (18-24) and 2 (9%) are 
“nontraditional” college age students (25+). Of the scored participants reporting, 16 
report a business administration major (7 management, 2 computer information systems, 
3 marketing, 3 organization and innovation management) and 8 are hospitality 
management majors. The distribution of students reporting length of time as part of the 
cohort is on Table 4.1 on page 74. 
For this class a random sample of 5 student responses to the values students 
assigned to each of the decision considerations in Scenario 1 were shared. Due to the time 
constraints experienced with Groups 4 and 5 at CSU, a sample of 5 student responses to 
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the values students assigned to each of the decision considerations in Scenario 1 were 
shared (see Appendix E). Duplicate responses were removed from the set. 
Group 5 
This group was a CSU upper division Organizational Behavior and Leadership class and 
consisted of 36 participants resulting in 35 (97%) complete scored matched 
pretest/posttest pairs. Of those scored participants reporting (22), 14 are male and 21 are 
female, 1 is not a U.S. citizens and 1 is a non-native English speaker. For those reporting 
(16), ages of the group range from 20 to 24 with a mean age of 21.74, median of 22, and 
a mode of 22. Thirty-five students (100%) are “traditional” college age students (18-24) 
and none are “nontraditional” college age students (25+). Of the scored participants 
reporting, 14 report a management major, 13 are management and marketing majors, 3 
management and finance majors, 1 management and entrepreneurship major, 1 
management and HR major, 2 management and accounting majors, 1 management and 
interior design major, 1 management and equine science major, and 1 mechanical 
engineering major. The distribution of students reporting length of time as part of the 
cohort is on Table 4.1 on page 74. 
For this class a random sample of 5 student responses to the values students 
assigned to each of the decision considerations in Scenario 1 were shared. Due to the time 
constraints experienced with Groups 4 and 5 at CSU, a sample of 5 student responses to 
the values students assigned to each of the decision considerations in Scenario 1 were 
shared (see Appendix E). Duplicate responses were removed from the set. 
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Demographic Summary 
Table 4.1 on the next page provides a summary of demographic information by 
group. 
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Table 4.1 
 
Demographic Summary 
 
  Age Traditional/Non-
Traditional Student 
Gender 
Group Scored 
Participants 
Range Mean Median Mode Trad. Nontrad. Female Male 
1  11 19-45 27.36 27 19 5(45%) 6(55%) 11 0 
2 
 
20 18-48 29.3 27 26 5(25%) 15(75%) 15 5 
3 
 
17 19-50 25.93 23.5 22 8(50%) 8(50%) 6 11 
4 
 
24 20-36 22.09 21 21 20(91%) 2(9%) 12 10 
5 
 
35 20-24 21.74 22 22 35(100%) 0(0%) 21 14 
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Length of Time in Cohort 
 Table 4.2 below shows the time students reported being part of their cohort of 
students. An explanation of how cohorts are defined in this context follows the table. 
 
Table 4.2 
 
Length of Time in Cohort 
 
Group Years Frequency 
1 <1 1 
 1 3 
 2 4 
 3 1 
 4 1 
 >4 1 
2 <1 7 
 1 5 
 2 4 
 3 4 
 4 0 
 >4 0 
3 <1 4 
 1 6 
 2 4 
 3 2 
 4 1 
 >4 0 
4 <1 0 
 1 2 
 2 5 
 3 10 
 4 0 
 >4 0 
5 <1 3 
 1 0 
 2 5 
 3 5 
 4 9 
 >4 2 
 
 
 While these students were not in traditional cohorts (i.e. moving through all their 
classes together), they were part of lower or upper division groups. At MSC students are 
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Freshman and Sophomores taking the same business classes and there is often only 1 
section to choose from. CSU students were Juniors and Seniors and are taking many of 
their upper division classes together. Most students also live on campus and so have 
social relationships outside of class time with their classmates. 
 
DIT2 Measured Scores Data 
 
 
 Again, the primary purpose of this research is to explore the role reflecting on and 
sharing values plays in our individual decision-making schemas in groups. Specifically, 
whether introducing values into decision considerations can disrupt existing unconscious 
schemas. To accomplish this goal, the DIT2 was utilized to measure schema scores as 
they relate to the level of ethical decision-making development. For purposes of this 
research the following DIT-2 scores were analyzed: 
1) Postconventional Schema Score (P Score). This score measures how much of 
the decision-making process falls into the Stages 5 and 6 categories of Kohlberg’s 
value development scale. As the description states, this is the Postconventional 
stage of value development. An increase in score indicates an improvement 
Postconventional ethical decision-making. 
2) New Index Score (N2 Score). The N2 score is designed to measure: a) “The 
degree to which Postconventional items are prioritized”, and b) “The degree to 
which Personal interest items (lower stage items) receive lower ratings than the 
ratings given to Postconventional items (higher stage items)” (Bebeau & Thoma, 
2003, p. 19). It provides an overall level of value development, not just a schema 
score. An increase in score indicates an improvement in Postconventional ethical 
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decision-making and movement away from lower stage (Personal interest) ethical 
decision-making. 
3) Utilizer Score (U Score). This score “represents the degree of match between 
items endorsed as most important and the action choice on that story” (Bebeau 
and Thoma, 2003, p. 21). In other words, how well the participant selected a 
menu of decision considerations that were directly related to their decision.  
As the number of participants in all but one of the groups was less than 30, I have 
decided to discuss the results by school and for all participants. I have looked at the 
statistics at the group level and did not find any significant data that was inconsistent with 
the school and all participant levels. For reference the N2 Score Descriptive statistics and 
t-Test results by group are attached in Appendix F. While not relevant to the results being 
reported in this study, the lower stage scores (Stage 23 and 4P Scores) were analyzed by 
group, school, and all data to look for any abnormalities that might indicate students were 
performing at a level lower than what would be consistent with their age group. No 
abnormalities or significant pretest/posttest changes were observed. For reference, 
descriptive and t-Test data for the Stage 23 and 4P Score is available in Appendix G. 
 
MSC Scores 
  
Postconventional schema score.  Descriptive data for MSC is listed below. 
 
Table 4.3 
 
MSC Postconventional Schema Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
Pscore  Pre MSC Pscore Post MSC 
       
Mean 30.25 Mean 32.33333333 
Standard Error 1.854288684 Standard Error 1.775855935 
Median 30 Median 34 
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Mode 38 Mode 36 
Standard 
Deviation 12.84688885 
Standard 
Deviation 12.30349083 
Sample Variance 165.0425532 Sample Variance 151.3758865 
Kurtosis 0.265591982 Kurtosis 0.109293307 
Skewness 0.370817737 Skewness 0.180855038 
Range 62 Range 58 
Minimum 4 Minimum 6 
Maximum 66 Maximum 64 
Sum 1452 Sum 1552 
Count 48 Count 48 
 
A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below).  
Figure 4.1. MSC PScore Prettest  Figure 4.2. MSC PScore Posttest   
  
The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.75. A two-
tailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 2.01 and an observed t Stat of -1.64 suggesting 
the 2.08-point increase in the mean values is not statistically significant. A two-tailed p-
value of 0.11 supports a failure to reject the null hypothesis for the MSC 
Postconventional Schema Score. 
N2 Index score. Descriptive data for MSC is listed on the next page. 
 
 
 
0 20 40 0 20 40
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Table 4.4 
 
MSC N2 Index Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
N2 Score Pre MSC N2 Score Post MSC 
       
Mean 27.94360339 Mean 32.26344346 
Standard Error 1.820240205 Standard Error 2.080446036 
Median 28.33984424 Median 34.93098236 
Mode #N/A Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 12.61099407 Standard Deviation 14.41375295 
Sample Variance 159.0371714 Sample Variance 207.756274 
Kurtosis -0.973468014 Kurtosis -0.898486707 
Skewness -0.189759437 Skewness 0.120923696 
Range 50.39917637 Range 57.82962879 
Minimum 1.662813234 Minimum 6.446759816 
Maximum 52.06198961 Maximum 64.2763886 
Sum 1341.292962 Sum 1548.645286 
Count 48 Count 48 
 
A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 below).  
Figure 4.3. MSC N2Score Pretest  Figure 4.4. MSC N2Score Posttest   
 
The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.77. A two-
tailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 2.01 and an observed t Stat of -3.22 suggesting 
the 4.32-point increase in the mean values is statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value 
of 0.002 supports a rejection of the null hypothesis for the MSC New Index Score. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 -10 10 30 50
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Consistent with Cohen’s (1992) use of Pearson’s Correlation as a test of effect size, these 
results indicate a large effect size. 
 Utilizer score.  For the utilizer score n was reduced from 48 to 47. This is 
because the data used to calculate the score is different from the other scores, and one 
participant had incomplete data in this category. Descriptive data for MSC is listed 
below. 
Table 4.5 
 
MSC Utilizer Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
Utilizer Pre MSC Utilizer Post MSC 
       
Mean 0.204736493 Mean 0.159430344 
Standard Error 0.019693299 Standard Error 0.02151818 
Median 0.207656004 Median 0.162821185 
Mode #N/A Mode 0 
Standard 
Deviation 0.135010456 
Standard 
Deviation 0.147521212 
Sample Variance 0.018227823 Sample Variance 0.021762508 
Kurtosis 0.723993139 Kurtosis 0.122321601 
Skewness 0.144556954 Skewness 0.125507068 
Range 0.542737284 Range 0.688368165 
Minimum 0.080230729 Minimum 0.174471993 
Maximum 0.462506555 Maximum 0.513896172 
Sum 9.622615184 Sum 7.493226151 
Count 47 Count 47 
 
A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 on the next page). 
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Figure 4.5. MSC Utilizer Pretest  Figure 4.6 MSC Utilizer Posttest  
 
The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.74. A two-
tailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 2.01 and an observed t Stat of 3.05 suggesting 
the 0.04-point decrease in the mean values is statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value 
of 0.004 supports a rejection of the null hypothesis for the MSC Utilizer Score. 
Consistent with Cohen’s (1992) use of Pearson’s Correlation as a test of effect size, these 
results indicate a large effect size. 
 
CSU Scores 
 
Postconventional schema score. Descriptive data for CSU is listed below 
Table 4.6 
 
CSU Postconventional Schema Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
0 20 40
0 20 40
Pscore Pre CSU Pscore Post CSU 
       
Mean 35.05084746 Mean 31.79661017 
Standard Error 1.972550339 Standard Error 2.415464939 
Median 34 Median 30 
Mode 42 Mode 24 
Standard 
Deviation 15.15144665 
Standard 
Deviation 18.55353825 
Sample Variance 229.5663355 Sample Variance 344.2337814 
Kurtosis 0.556925883 Kurtosis 0.536846207 
Skewness 0.420460073 Skewness 0.324959692 
Range 62 Range 76 
Minimum 10 Minimum 0 
Maximum 72 Maximum 76 
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A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see 
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 below). 
Figure 4.7. CSU PScore Pretest   Figure 4.8 CSU PScore Posttest 
 
The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.73. A two-
tailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 2.00 and an observed t Stat of 1.95 suggesting 
the 3.25-point decrease in the mean values is not statistically significant and supports a 
failure to reject the null hypothesis for the CSU Postconventional Schema Score. 
However, two-tailed p-value of 0.06 indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis for α = 
.10. Consistent with Cohen’s (1992) use of Pearson’s Correlation as a test of effect size, 
these results indicate a large effect size. 
N2 Index score.  Descriptive data for CSU is listed on the following page. 
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Sum 2068 Sum 1876 
Count 59 Count 59 
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Table 4.7 
 
CSU N2 Index Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
N2 Score Pre CSU N2 Score Post CSU 
       
Mean 32.99772139 Mean 31.47021292 
Standard Error 1.881112029 Standard Error 2.263203332 
Median 33.72876867 Median 33.5596598 
Mode #N/A Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 14.44909566 Standard Deviation 17.38399465 
Sample Variance 208.7763654 Sample Variance 302.20327 
Kurtosis -0.461154555 Kurtosis -0.570050312 
Skewness 0.220634071 Skewness 0.367551738 
Range 61.14372514 Range 71.79608888 
Minimum 5.300049497 Minimum 1.186909712 
Maximum 66.44377464 Maximum 72.98299859 
Sum 1946.865562 Sum 1856.742562 
Count 59 Count 59 
 
A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see 
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 below).  
Figure 4.9. CSU N2Score Pretest  Figure 4.10. CSU N2Score Posttest   
 
The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.75. A two-
tailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 2.00 and an observed t Stat of 1.02 suggesting 
the 1.53-point increase in the mean values is not statistically significant. A two-tailed p-
value of 0.31 supports a failure to reject the null hypothesis for the CSU New Index 
Score. 
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Utilizer score.  For the utilizer score n was reduced from 59 to 56. This is 
because the data used to calculate the score is different from the other scores, and 3 
participants had incomplete data needed to calculate the score in this category. 
Descriptive data for CSU is listed below. 
Table 4.8 
 
CSU Utilizer Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
Utilizer Pre CSU Utilizer Post 
       
Mean 0.126362085 Mean 0.094170655 
Standard Error 0.018289875 Standard Error 0.017765001 
Median 0.095107623 Median 0.089472952 
Mode 0 Mode 0 
Standard 
Deviation 0.136868892 
Standard 
Deviation 0.132941094 
Sample Variance 0.018733094 Sample Variance 0.017673335 
Kurtosis 0.276525868 Kurtosis 2.138069176 
Skewness 0.770059003 Skewness 0.565884025 
Range 0.636753612 Range 0.783210405 
Minimum -0.11341853 Minimum 0.382275826 
Maximum 0.523335081 Maximum 0.400934579 
Sum 7.076276769 Sum 5.273556698 
Count 56 Count 56 
 
A test for skewness indicates the data is moderately skewed (see Figures 4.11 and 
4.12 on the next page).  
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Figure 4.11. CSU Utilizer Pretest  Figure 4.12. CSU Utilizer Posttest  
 
 The data has low to moderate positive correlation with a Pearson Correlation of 
0.33. A two-tailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 2.00 and an observed t Stat of 1.54 
suggesting the 0.03-point decrease in the mean values is not statistically significant. A 
two-tailed p-value of 0.13 supports a failure to reject the null hypothesis for the CSU 
Utilizer Score.  
 
All Data Scores 
 
 All scores were analyzed at the “all data” level for all groups and all schools. In 
the areas were there were not inconsistencies across schools (Personal Interest and 
Maintaining Norms Scores), none were found at the all data level. As some of the school 
level statistics for the Postconventional Schema, New Index, and Utilizer Scores suggests 
a rejection of the null hypothesis, the results at the all data level for those scores are 
presented here for comparison. 
Postconventional schema score.  Descriptive data for all data (n=107) is listed 
on the following page. 
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Table 4.9 
 
All Data Postconventional Schema Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
Pscore  Pre All Data Pscore Post 
       
Mean 32.89719626 Mean 32.03738318 
Standard Error 1.382622239 Standard Error 1.545405488 
Median 30 Median 32 
Mode 42 Mode 36 
Standard 
Deviation 14.30195565 
Standard 
Deviation 15.98579867 
Sample Variance 204.5459355 Sample Variance 255.5457591 
Kurtosis 0.195573274 Kurtosis 0.164725703 
Skewness 0.464953808 Skewness 0.29031359 
Range 68 Range 76 
Minimum 4 Minimum 0 
Maximum 72 Maximum 76 
Sum 3520 Sum 3428 
Count 107 Count 107 
 
A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see 
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 below).  
Figure 4.13. All Data PScore Pretest       Figure 4.14. All Data PScore Posttest  
 
The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.72. A two-
tailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 1.98 and an observed t Stat of 0.78 suggesting 
the 0.87-point increase in the mean values is not statistically significant. A two-tailed p-
value of 0.44 supports a failure to reject the null hypothesis for all data in the 
Maintaining Norms Schema Score 
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N2 Index score. Descriptive data for CSU is listed below. 
Table 4.10 
 
All Data N2 Index Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
N2 Score Pre All Data N2 Score Post All Data 
       
Mean 30.7304535 Mean 31.82605466 
Standard Error 1.336513636 Standard Error 1.551700796 
Median 31.29248276 Median 34.19921192 
Mode #N/A Mode #N/A 
Standard 
Deviation 13.82500455 Standard Deviation 16.05091784 
Sample Variance 191.1307508 Sample Variance 257.6319636 
Kurtosis 0.424322622 Kurtosis 0.621739994 
Skewness 0.144334339 Skewness 0.275747926 
Range 64.78096141 Range 71.79608888 
Minimum 1.662813234 Minimum 1.186909712 
Maximum 66.44377464 Maximum 72.98299859 
Sum 3288.158524 Sum 3405.387849 
Count 107 Count 107 
 
A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see 
Figures 4.15 and 4.16 below).  
Figure 4.15. All Data N2Score Pretest Figure 4.16. All Data N2Score Posttest  
 
 
The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.74. A two-
tailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 1.98 and an observed t Stat of -1.03 suggesting 
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the 1.10-point increase in the mean values is not statistically significant. A two-tailed p-
value of 0.30 supports a failure to reject the null hypothesis for all data in the New Index 
Score. 
Utilizer score. Descriptive data for all data (n = 103) is listed below. 
Table 4.11 
 
All Data Utilizer Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
Utilizer Pre All Data Utilizer Post 
       
Mean 0.162125165 Mean 0.123949348 
Standard Error 0.013885951 Standard Error 0.014077159 
Median 0.134242265 Median 0.114840063 
Mode 0 Mode 0 
Standard 
Deviation 0.140927008 
Standard 
Deviation 0.142867561 
Sample Variance 0.019860421 Sample Variance 0.02041114 
Kurtosis 0.649444608 Kurtosis 1.132244456 
Skewness 0.309941174 Skewness 0.111179382 
Range 0.636753612 Range 0.896171998 
Minimum -0.11341853 Minimum 0.382275826 
Maximum 0.523335081 Maximum 0.513896172 
Sum 16.69889195 Sum 12.76678285 
Count 103 Count 103 
 
A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see Figures 
4.17 and 4.18 on the next page).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
VALUES IN MICROECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING 90 
Figure 4.17. All Data Utilizer Pretest Figure 4.18. All Data Utilizer Posttest 
 
The data is moderately positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.55. A 
two-tailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 1.98 and an observed t Stat of 2.89 
suggesting the 0.04-point decrease in the mean values is statistically significant. A two-
tailed p-value of 0.005 supports a rejection of the null hypothesis for all data in the 
Utilizer Score. Consistent with Cohen’s (1992) use of Pearson’s Correlation as a test of 
effect size, these results indicate a large effect size. 
 
Number of Values Shared Scores 
 
 As discussed previously, time limitations did not allow as many values to be 
shared in Groups 4 & 5 (CSU). To have a MSC equivalent, Group 3 also shared 5 value 
sets, although time was not an issue with this group. The following tests for differences in 
results based on sharing 10 or more and only 5 of the student responses to the values 
expressed exercise for the Postconventional Schema, New Index, and Utilizer Scores. 
 Postconventional schema score. Descriptive data for 10+ (n = 31) and 5 (n = 76) 
responses shared are listed on the following page. 
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Table 4.12 
 
Shared 10+ Postconventional Schema Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
Pscore Pre Shared 10+ Pscore Post Shared 10+ 
       
Mean 31.29032258 Mean 32.70967742 
Standard Error 2.120150912 Standard Error 2.146361537 
Median 32 Median 32 
Mode 32 Mode 36 
Standard 
Deviation 11.80450069 
Standard 
Deviation 11.95043527 
Sample Variance 139.3462366 Sample Variance 142.8129032 
Kurtosis 0.061780038 Kurtosis 0.083121238 
Skewness 0.135360544 Skewness 0.407443112 
Range 54 Range 54 
Minimum 4 Minimum 10 
Maximum 58 Maximum 64 
Sum 970 Sum 1014 
Count 31 Count 31 
 
Table 4.13 
 
Shared 5 Postconventional Schema Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
Pscore Pre Shared 5 Pscore Post Shared 5 
       
Mean 33.55263158 Mean 31.76315789 
Standard Error 1.746615247 Standard Error 1.999286576 
Median 30 Median 32 
Mode 42 Mode 34 
Standard 
Deviation 15.22663871 
Standard 
Deviation 17.42937629 
Sample Variance 231.8505263 Sample Variance 303.7831579 
Kurtosis 0.436529452 Kurtosis -0.39143388 
Skewness 0.518998211 Skewness 0.294684185 
Range 64 Range 76 
Minimum 8 Minimum 0 
Maximum 72 Maximum 76 
Sum 2550 Sum 2414 
Count 76 Count 76 
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A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see 
Figures 4.19 through 4.22 below).  
Figure 4.19. 10+ PScore Pretest  Figure 4.20. 10+ PScore Posttest   
 
Figure 4.21. 5 PScore Pretest   Figure 4.22. 5 PScore Posttest 
  
The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.84 for the 
10+ group and 0.70 for the 5 group. A two-tailed correlated t-Test found a critical t of 
2.04 for the 10+ group and an observed t Stat of -1.17 suggesting the 1.42-point increase 
in the mean values is not statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value of 0.25 supports a 
failure to reject the null hypothesis for the 10+ Maintaining Norms Schema Score. 
A two-tailed correlated t-Test found a critical t of 1.99 for the 5 group and an 
observed t Stat of 1.22 suggesting the 1.79-point decrease in the mean values is not 
statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value of 0.23 supports a failure to reject the null 
hypothesis for the 5 Maintaining Norms Schema Score. 
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N2 Index score.  Descriptive data for 10+ (n = 31) and 5 (n = 76) responses 
shared are listed below. 
Table 4.14 
 
Shared 10+ N2 Index Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
N2Score Pre Shared 10+ N2Score Post Shared 10+ 
       
Mean 28.38912904 Mean 31.72975939 
Standard Error 2.390570583 Standard Error 2.761188988 
Median 29.91984919 Median 35.73612658 
Mode #N/A Mode #N/A 
Standard 
Deviation 13.3101337 
Standard 
Deviation 15.37364965 
Sample Variance 177.1596591 Sample Variance 236.3491035 
Kurtosis 0.840937711 Kurtosis -1.33088735 
Skewness 0.339877518 Skewness 0.017614304 
Range 50.39917637 Range 51.9509142 
Minimum 1.662813234 Minimum 6.446759816 
Maximum 52.06198961 Maximum 58.39767402 
Sum 880.0630002 Sum 983.6225411 
Count 31 Count 31 
 
Table 4.15 
 
Shared 5 N2 Index Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
N2Score Pre Shared 5 N2Score Post Shared 5 
      
Mean 31.68546742 Mean 31.86533299 
Standard Error 1.606227905 Standard Error 1.883357879 
Median 31.40542903 Median 33.62197303 
Mode #N/A Mode #N/A 
Standard 
Deviation 14.00277024 
Standard 
Deviation 16.41873334 
Sample Variance 196.0775744 Sample Variance 269.5748044 
Kurtosis -0.44118115 Kurtosis 0.414103569 
Skewness 0.287741742 Skewness 0.371488948 
Range 61.14372514 Range 71.79608888 
Minimum 5.300049497 Minimum 1.186909712 
Maximum 66.44377464 Maximum 72.98299859 
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Sum 2408.095524 Sum 2421.765308 
Count 76 Count 76 
 
A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see 
Figures 4.23 through 4.26 below).  
Figure 4.23. 10+ NScore Pretest  Figure 4.24. 10+ NScore Posttest 
  
Figure 4.25. 5 NScore Pretest  Figure 4.26. 5 NScore Posttest   
  
The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.88 for the 
10+ group and 0.70 for the 5 group. A two-tailed correlated t-Test found a critical t of 
2.04 for the 10+ group and an observed t Stat of -2.58 suggesting the 3.34-point increase 
in the mean values is statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value of 0.02 supports a 
rejection of the null hypothesis for the 10+ N2 Index Score. Consistent with Cohen’s 
(1992) use of Pearson’s Correlation as a test of effect size, these results indicate a large 
effect size. 
A two-tailed correlated t-Test found a critical t of 1.99 for the 5 group and an 
observed t Stat of -0.13 suggesting the 0.18-point increase in the mean values is not 
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0 10 20 30
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statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value of 0.90 supports a failure to reject the null 
hypothesis for the 5 N2 Index Score. 
Utilizer score. Descriptive data for 10+ (n = 30) and 5 (n = 76) responses shared 
are listed on the following page. 
Table 4.16 
 
Shared 10+ Utilizer Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
Utilizer Pre Shared 10+ Utilizer Post Shared 10+ 
       
Mean 0.221827634 Mean 0.172362043 
Standard Error 0.022022013 Standard Error 0.02351598 
Median 0.221399887 Median 0.163756566 
Mode #N/A Mode 0 
Standard 
Deviation 0.120619535 
Standard 
Deviation 0.128802326 
Sample Variance 0.014549072 Sample Variance 0.016590039 
Kurtosis 0.776757779 Kurtosis 0.809677578 
Skewness 0.157485846 Skewness -0.27983185 
Range 0.450668549 Range 0.595552223 
Minimum 0.011838006 Minimum 0.174471993 
Maximum 0.462506555 Maximum 0.421080231 
Sum 6.654829024 Sum 5.170861277 
Count 30 Count 30 
 
Table 4.17 
 
Shared 10+ Utilizer Score Descriptive Statistics 
 
Utilizer Pre Shared 5 Utilizer Post Shared 5 
       
Mean 0.137589903 Mean 0.10405372 
Standard Error 0.016626458 Standard Error 0.016902529 
Median 0.106492478 Median 0.100943891 
Mode 0 Mode 0 
Standard 
Deviation 0.142056517 
Standard 
Deviation 0.144415269 
Sample Variance 0.020180054 Sample Variance 0.02085577 
Kurtosis 0.397561041 Kurtosis 1.554738183 
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Skewness 0.524816754 Skewness 0.003220993 
Range 0.636753612 Range 0.896171998 
Minimum -0.11341853 Minimum 0.382275826 
Maximum 0.523335081 Maximum 0.513896172 
Sum 10.04406293 Sum 7.595921572 
Count 73 Count 73 
 
A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see 
Figures 4.27 through 4.30 below).  
Figure 4.27. 10+ Utilizer Pretest  Figure 4.28. 10+ Utilizer Posttest 
 
Figure 4.29. 5 Utilizer Pretest  Figure 4.30. 5 Utilizer Posttest   
 
The 10+ data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.67, 
but the 5 group is only moderately correlated at 0.48. A two-tailed correlated t-Test found 
a critical t of 2.05 for the 10+ group and an observed t Stat of 2.70 suggesting the 0.05-
point decrease in the mean values is statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value of 0.01 
supports a rejection of the null hypothesis for the 10+ Utilizer Score. 
A two-tailed correlated t-Test found a critical t of 1.99 for the 5 group and an observed t 
Stat of 1.96 suggesting the 0.04-point decrease in the mean values is just barely not 
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statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value of 0.05 supports a rejection of the null 
hypothesis for the 5 N2 Index Score. 
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Results Summary 
 
 The chart below is a summary by data level and index of the results described in this chapter. The summary includes 
the recommendation to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
Table 4.18  
 
Results Summary 
 
Data Level Index 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Critical 
t Observed t p-value 
Reject the Null 
Hypothesis? 
Effect 
Size 
    MSC Postconventional 0.75 2.01 -1.64 0.110 Fail to reject N/A 
 N2 0.77 2.01 -3.22 0.002 Yes Large 
  Utilizer 0.74 2.01 3.05 0.004 Yes Large 
   CSU Postconventional 0.73 2.00 1.95 0.060 Yes at 90% C.L. Large 
 N2 0.75 2.00 1.02 0.310 Fail to reject N/A 
  Utilizer 0.33 2.00 1.54 0.130 Fail to reject N/A 
   All Data Postconventional 0.72 1.98 0.78 0.440 Fail to reject N/A 
 N2 0.74 1.98 -1.03 0.300 Fail to reject N/A 
  Utilizer 0.55 1.98 2.89 0.005 Yes Large 
   10+ 
Shared Postconventional 0.84 2.04 -1.17 0.250 Fail to reject N/A 
 N2 0.88 2.04 -2.58 0.020 Yes Large 
  Utilizer 0.67 2.05 2.70 0.010 Yes Large 
  5 Shared Postconventional 0.70 1.99 1.22 0.230 Fail to reject N/A 
 N2 0.70 1.99 -0.13 0.900 Fail to reject N/A 
 Utilizer 0.48 1.99 1.96 0.050 Yes Large 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
 
According to Rest et al. (2000), over 25 years of data—with approximately 13, 
386 responses with 10, 870 included in the analysis—have found test-retest results 
without interventions to be unchanged for all groups. Researchers have also found that 
DIT scores “show significant gains due to moral educational programs of more than 3 
weeks” and during the college years in liberal arts programs (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). 
This study is unique in that the intervention is very short, does not attempt to “teach” 
participants about values or ethical decision-making, and is largely personal in its impact 
as there is no discussion, only sharing. This supports the exploratory nature of the 
research. The intervention does reframe decision-making in value terms and brings the 
assignment of values to decision considerations to the conscious level for individuals and 
the group. Yet this minor intervention did cause some statistically significant changes in 
scores. 
 
Postconventional and N2 Scores 
 
 When the results are analyzed for all participants together, there is little change in 
the Postconventional and N2 Scores, however there are some interesting and significant 
results when we look at the schools individually. MSC students improved their N2 Scores 
by a statistically significant 4.32 points. This indicates they shifted their use of lower 
stage items to Postconventional items and became better ethical decision-makers. They 
also increased their Postconventional scores by 2.08 points. Tests for statistical 
significance were not quite enough to support statistical significance at a 90% confidence 
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level (p-value 0.11) for the Postconventional scores, but it does contribute to the upward 
trend of MSC scores reflected in the N2 score.  
CSU students, by contrast, saw a decrease of 3.25 points in their Postconventional 
scores indicating the amount of their decision-making in Stages 5 and 6 may have 
decreased as these results are only statistically significant at a 90% confidence level. The 
student’s N2 scores decreased by 1.53 points, which was not a statistically significant 
change. At a 95% confidence level the results indicate that the CSU groups scores were 
relatively unchanged. 
 
Norm Comparisons Postconventional and N2 Scores 
 
Assuming the CSU scores were unchanged or only had a very small change, what 
might have contributed to no change or a small change in ethical decision-making at CSU 
while there were significant improvements at MSC? The DIT norms suggest several 
factors that correlate with scores that might give us some clues.  
Cognitive development. DIT scores are often positively correlated with cognitive 
development including IQ, general intelligence, achievement, and GPA. While GPA data 
on all participants was not available, we can make some inferences about the cognitive 
development of our groups. CSU is a selective school and according to the Colorado 
State University Profile (2013), students admitted to the university are in the 74
th
 
percentile of their graduating class, have an average high school GPA of 3.59, an ACT 
composite score of 24.7, and/or a SAT combined score of 1142. MSC is an open 
enrollment school and does not have any gates for class rank, high school GPA, or ACT 
or SAT scores. We can infer from their open enrollment status that MSC will have a 
much broader range of student ability than CSU. MSC students are required to take a 
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math and English placement test and with only 75% of students entering the school with 
college level math and/or reading skills, we can also assume the level of cognitive 
development of MSC students entering the school is lower than CSU.  
Because of this difference, norms indicate that CSU students would have higher 
scores on the DIT than MSC students. On the pretest, this was true with a CSU 
Postconventional score of 35.05 compared to MSC’s at 30.25 and N2 Scores of 33.00 
(CSU) and 27.94 (MSC). However, cognitive development fails to explain the posttest 
results as MSC’s posttest scores for both the Postconventional and N2 Scores were above 
CSU’s and overall closer in value with CSU than the pretest scores were. 
Education. A second factor that is often correlated with DIT scores is level of 
education. Related to college students the norms indicate junior and senior level students 
will outperform freshman and sophomore level students. Again, this factor fails to 
explain the posttest scores as the CSU students were juniors and seniors in upper division 
classes and should have outperformed the MSC students who were largely freshman and 
sophomores in lower division classes. 
Gender. Gender is another factor that often predicts performance on 
Postconventional scores. Norms indicate female participants generally score higher than 
males. In this study 67% of MSC participants were female and 58% at CSU. Based on 
these ratios we might expect the MSC group to consistently outscore the CSU group, but 
that was not the case. However, the N2 Score results for MSC may have been impacted 
by the high percentage of women in the group. When looked at alone, female participants 
increased their mean score by a statistically significant 5.18 points (t-critical 2.04, 
observed t -3.26, p-value .003) compared to the male participants who increased their 
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score by a statistically insignificant 2.61 points. Similar gender differences were not 
observed at CSU.  
It is possible that traditionally higher scores by women could indicate more 
sensitivity to values and ethics in decision-making then men and/or that women are more 
likely to adjust individual decision-making in a group when values are shared. Several 
studies support the possibility of either of these factors influencing ethics scores. A study 
on business students by Stedham et al. (2007) found that women have a stronger “intent” 
to behave in an ethical manner so by reframing the decision-making process in values 
terms, the study may have engaged the ethical decision-making perspective to a higher 
degree for women than it did for the male participants as females appear to be more 
sensitive to subtle ethical context than males are. Studies have also indicated that women 
“focus their [ethical] analysis on personal, relationship-oriented aspects of an action” 
(Stedham et al., 2007, p. 171) and are less likely to prefer competitive success and more 
likely to promote harmonious work relationships and engage in social learning (Ameen, 
Guffey, & McMillan, 1996). While men are more likely to focus on clear-cut objective 
criteria in ethical decision-making, women are more likely to consider ‘relative’ 
considerations (Stedham et al., 2007). Female students are also more likely to engage in 
impression management than males so by reframing decision-making in a values/ethics 
framework, female students may be more likely to answer in a way that will give the 
impression of being ethical (Becker & Ulstad, 2007). The fact that there were not similar 
results for N2 or P Scores at CSU might indicate that gender was one, but not the only 
factor that caused women at MSC to improve their scores more dramatically than men. 
 
Non-Normed Factors for Postconventional and N2 Scores 
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 Reviewing the norms associated with the DIT-2 did not sufficiently explain our 
results. As this research is utilizing an intervention that appears to be significantly 
different than the pre- and posttest experiments in the past, it is possible that the norms do 
not apply as strongly to this research. The following are some other factors to consider 
that might help explain the results. 
Group cognitive “sameness” and number of values shared. One issue that 
needs to be considered is to what degree the participants in the groups were similar 
before the experiment and how that may have impacted results. As discussed in the 
“Cognitive Development” section, there are reasons to believe the individual’s in the 
CSU group were more alike than the individual’s in the MSC group. The CSU students 
all went through a competitive admission process that was looking for similar 
characteristics, intellectual capacity, etc. The MSC students were part of an open 
enrollment campus and provide a much more diverse, although more geographically 
isolated group.  
As we assume decision-making is a cognitive process, it is possible that the 
cognitive “sameness” of the individuals in the CSU classes impacted their ability to be 
influenced by the sharing of values, because there values were less diverse to begin with 
as they shared a similar cognitive decision-making process. To test for “sameness” I 
looked at the three groups that only shared 5 sets of values and compared the average 
number of distinct values shared per decision consideration. The groups included both 
CSU groups (Groups 4 & 5) and one MSC group (Group 3). I found that the MSC group 
averaged 4.4 values per decision consideration and CSU Group 4 averaged 4.2 and Group 
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5 averaged 3.5. This does provides some evidence that the CSU groups, especially Group 
5 had more similar values systems prior to the experiment than MSC students did.  
Another factor is that students in the CSU classes only shared 5 random sets of 
values, whereas 2 of 3 MSC classes shared 13 and 10. When the data was analyzed using 
the number of sets of values shared, the “10+” group (n = 31) had a statistically 
significant increase in the N2 Score, whereas the “5” group (n = 76) had no significant 
changes. This data supports a possibility that the number and diversity of the values 
shared might also make a difference in future decision-making; however, additional 
research needs to be done to verify these potential correlations. 
 Relationships. Another factor the results lead us to consider is the potential role 
of relationships. Much of the literature reviewed on the values ether (Bell, 2011b), 
behavioral economics/finance (Ariely, 2008; Sen 1977; 1994; Thaler 1988; Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2009) value development (Schwartz, 1992; Kohlberg, 1973; Babeau, et al, 
1999), social learning theory (Bandura, 1977), and sensemaking in organizations (Weick, 
1995; Weick et al., 2005) suggest relationships have an impact on values in decision-
making. It is possible to infer from the distinct differences in the groups that there may be 
some different levels of relationships between the CSU and MSC students. According to 
the Colorado State University Profile (2013), students at CSU come from every state in 
the country with 80% being Colorado residents. The campus and community are large 
both in geographic and population terms and students are primarily of traditional college 
age (24 and under). By contrast, MSC students are primarily local with 96% of the 
student population coming from Alaska and 44% graduating from high schools in one the 
MSC local area communities. The campus and the student population are small as is the 
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number of full-time faculty (29). Only 57% of MSC students are of traditional age and 
43% are non-traditional (University of Alaska Planning and Institutional Research, 2011). 
The differences between the two campuses make it likely that MSC students may 
have stronger and longer relationships with each other and faculty and staff than CSU 
students do. These relationships may extend beyond the campus and into the local 
community. Many of the MSC students have known each other even before attending the 
university and the small campus size allows them to get to know a greater percentage of 
the other students, faculty and staff. Smaller class sizes also allow students to form 
relationships and get to know the perspectives of other students through class discussions. 
The size of the individual groups might also be a factor in this research as it relates to 
relationship building. The MSC students are not only more likely to come from the same 
small community, but are also generally older so they may have known each other for a 
longer period of time. For students reporting their length of time with their cohort, the 
majority of MSC students (78.7%) report being part of their cohort for 2 years or less, 
whereas the majority of CSU students (63%) report a 3 or more year relationship with 
their cohort. If relationships were a factor, it does not appear that the shorter length of 
time in the MSC cohort impacted their relationships in a negative way indicating that 
perhaps other factors strengthen relationships of university students. 
The issue of relationships also ties back to the discussion of gender. As the 
majority of participants at MSC were female—and were the group primarily responsible 
for the N2 Score increase—we need to consider the combination of gender and 
relationships as a possible explanation for the differences in scores between MSC and 
CSU students. In a previous section I discussed how women might be more sensitive to 
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values and ethics in decision-making and have stronger intent to behave ethically. They 
are also more likely to analyze their decision-making relative to others, engage in social 
learning, and be concerned with harmonious relationships. By reframing the discussion of 
decision-making in a value context and by and reflecting on and sharing values, it is 
possible that females in small groups within which they have strong relationships might 
have been more likely to move toward more shared ethical decision-making than women 
who are in groups that do not have strong relationships or are in some way moderated by 
an equal male presence.  
 
Utilizer Scores 
 
Another data point that is significant to this study is the utilizer score (U Score). 
The U Score measures the degree of match between the action participants said they 
would take in each of the scenarios and the decision considerations they rated as most 
important. The test assumes certain decision considerations, when important to the 
decision-maker, will lead to a specific action. For every data level with the exception of 
the CSU group alone, the U Scores dropped by a statistically significant amount posttest.  
One possible reason for this decrease might be a limitation of the test itself. This 
score is essentially designed to test the ability of participants to rationally analyze 
available factors and match them to decision-making. The test assumes rationality and 
access to all information, as the scope of available information is provided in the scenario 
and given decision considerations. It does not assume that participants are brining other 
factors—like values—to the decision-making process. Students taking a posttest after a 
course in ethics might be likely to see an increase in the U Score because it is this rational 
process of ethical decision-making that those courses attempt to teach. However, by 
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reframing the decision-making process in a values perspective, the experiment may have 
brought the value portion of the decision-making process to the forefront impacting the 
rational decision-making process. Students may have selected answers and decision 
considerations that were consistent with their values and these may have conflicted with 
what is consistent with rational decision-making. While outside the scope of this paper, 
qualitative analysis of the value sets and decision sets might provide some insights into 
the level of “values fit” versus “rational fit” of the participant’s responses. It is also 
important to note that the scores dropped the most for the “10+” shared value sets 
indicating that perhaps the more values perspectives shared, the more prominent values 
become as a decision consideration. This might also explain the lack of significant 
change at CSU. Kahneman (2011) would refer to this as values “priming”. The more you 
are primed to think of values the more you will use values factors rather than “rational” 
factors in matching decisions to decision considerations. 
It is also possible that by framing the decision-making process in value terms that 
the opportunity set—the set of alternative actions an individual can take to solve a 
problem—changed for the individuals. Sen (1994) believes that when the opportunity set 
is influenced by ethics, social behavior, epistemology, or other non-rational choice 
influences these factors narrow the opportunity set. He refers to this process as menu 
dependency; meaning when non-rational factors are added to the decision the menu of 
choices becomes smaller than the opportunity set. There may have been some decision 
considerations that while they were consistent with the action the individual believed he 
or she would take, may not have been consistent with their values. Or, they may have 
selected an action based on their values that was inconsistent with the rational decision-
VALUES IN MICROECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING 108 
making process they went through when selecting important decision considerations. It is 
also important to note, that while their decision-making process became more quasi-
rational, no group made decisions that were significantly less ethical than they did when 
they were using a more rational process. The MSC group actually significantly improved 
their scores bringing them up to approximately the same level at CSU students. 
 
Research Conclusions 
 
 Asking participants to reflect on and share the values they associate with decision 
considerations produced some significant results. MSC students demonstrated a 
statistically significant increase in their ethical decision-making ability, while all groups 
changed the way they used information to make ethical decisions.  
 Much of the literature reviewed suggests that relationships are an important factor 
when values are formed and utilized in decision-making. This research provides some 
support for that assertion at least within the context of women within small groups with 
relatively strong relationships in a community. Sharing a greater portion of the groups 
values might also impact improved ethical decision-making, however, more research is 
needed to determine if this factor also relates to gender, group size, and relationships.  
Group “sameness” may be a factor in maintaining a similar level of ethical 
decision-making even after a values context is introduced. This is because groups that are 
already very much the same, at least in terms of cognitive development and deciding to 
attend the same school, may already have similar values structures that will reinforce one 
another rather than challenge values. More cognitive and value diversity might cause 
others to be influenced by shared values in a group as demonstrated by the significant 
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improvements in ethical decision-making at MSC. This is important, because the MSC 
group may be more closely representative of the general population than the CSU group.  
 The increase in ethical decision-making by the MSC group suggests some 
interesting correlations between group size, group diversity, gender, and relationships in 
decision-making. However, the most significant result of this research is the Utilizer 
Score results. One goal of this research was to determine what the role of values is in 
decision-making. The models of economic decision-making assume a dichotomy between 
facts and values in decision-making with individuals always making decisions using 
rational factors. The Utilizer Score results indicate that values do play a role in how we 
make decisions. By framing decision-making in a values context and priming for values, 
values considerations were brought to the forefront and the decision-makers became 
more quasi-rational in their approach. Yet, in no way did it make participants worse 
decision-makers—at least in the ethical context measured here. In fact, some individuals 
and groups became significantly better ethical decision-makers even using an instrument 
that relies on rational decision-making as the assumption. The utilization of values in 
decision-making might make us more quasi-rational in our approach, but does not 
necessarily make us worse decision-makers. In other words, a quasi-rational approach to 
the decision-making process does not lead us to make less rational decisions. In this case, 
values changed what individuals believed were important issues to consider in the 
decision-making process, but did not lead them to less ethical decisions. Introducing 
conscious values to the process can interrupt unconscious values schemas. As this 
research is exploratory in nature, additional research will need to be done to further 
isolate all the potential factors discussed here to determine their impact on economic 
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decision-making. The purpose of this research is to provide potential signals of direction 
and hypotheses for future research. 
 It should be noted that values were not utilized alone, but along with the facts 
given in the scenario. These results do not tell us what would happen if we asked 
participants to use values alone in their decision-making. However, the combined use of 
facts and values in decision-making is consistent with and supports the values inclusive 
models of decision-making discussed in the literature (Bell, 2011b; Etzioni, 1988; Huei-
Chun, 2010; Subramaniam, 1963; Sen, 1994; 2004).   
 
Limitations 
 
One of the greatest threats to multiple group tests is the selection threat or 
selection bias as this was a convenience sample, specifically the primary internal validity 
issue, which is the degree to which the groups are comparable before the study. This 
issue has been addressed in the results section and having groups from one university that 
may have been more comparable before the study than the groups at the second 
university proved to be an asset to the study. The short duration of the experiment did 
minimize history, maturation, and mortality threats.  
Using validated and identical instruments administered by the same researcher 
across groups minimized one instrumentation threat. However, the instrument itself was 
both a limitation and an asset, as it was not designed for the type of intervention utilized 
here.  
As with any research, Type I (false positive) and Type II (false negative) errors 
were a threat. The researched attempted to minimize these threats by repeating the 
experiment 5 times. As this research is exploratory, repeating the experiment in the future 
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to gather additional data would help further minimize these threats and provide validity 
for the results discussed here.   
One potential limitation to any study is that it may not be representative of the 
general population. Using business students that are too similar might lead to concerns 
about generalizability; however, there were a diverse group of majors in the classes. In 
addition to business administration majors including human resources, entrepreneurship, 
finance, economics, hospitality management, accounting, and marketing majors there 
were computer science, mechanical engineering, nursing, logistics and supply chain 
management, human services, music, dental hygiene, computer networking technology, 
interior design and equine science majors represented in the classes. By including an 
“open enrollment” campus in the experiments this does help with generalizability, as 
these students are quite diverse. As a result, these findings should be generalizable to a 
broader population. This study was done in classrooms on university campuses, which 
leaves the potential for noise and other distractions that could impact participants. 
Another limitation is that the study asked participants to describe a single value 
that represented the personal values of a decision-maker who believed a particular 
decision consideration was important. It does not include multiple values that might be 
the optimal description. The study is also limited to the role of values in ethical decision-
making, whereas values may have a role in other aspects of decision-making. 
The time required to complete the experiment also proved to be a limitation. 
While I had several campuses willing to participate, individual professors and department 
heads were often unwilling to give up an entire class for the experiment. This 
significantly reduced my participant options. While this was a convenience sample, it 
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might have been preferable to have larger class sizes to more accurately analyze data for 
statistical significance at the group level. However, the variety of class sizes did add 
diversity and the ability to consider whether the size of the group might have impacted 
group or school results.  
Subject confidentiality is a potential ethical issue that was addressed by assigning 
anonymous participant numbers to each participant.  All results were stored in a secured 
file cabinet and computer to ensure confidentiality and integrity of the data. In addition, 
the study and use of student participants was reviewed and approved by the George Fox 
University Human Subjects Committee. A copy of the approval is available in Appendix 
H. 
 
Implications for Organizations and Leaders 
 
The literature reviewed for this study suggests, and nearly all the participants in 
these experiments have stated, that they consider their personal values when making 
work decisions (Brown & Trevino, 2006; Finegan, 2000; Gamble & Gibson, 1999; Jiang, 
Lin, & Lin, 2010; Keltner, Langner, & Allison, 2006; Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1989;  
Palmer, 2000; ; Suar & Khuntia, 2010; ). Bringing values to the conscious level can 
interrupt unconscious values schemas providing support for the influence of group, 
societal, environmental, and organizational values in microeconomic decision-making 
creating implications for organizations and leaders. There is also evidence to suggest that 
by adding a values framework to decision-making, employees may make better decisions 
or, if they already share similar values, they will maintain their current level of decision-
making at least from an ethical perspective.  
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As this experiment was limited to ethical decision-making and values, what can 
organizations and leaders learn from this research? As individual’s report bringing their 
personal values to work, how can leaders in organizations encourage ethical decision-
making in groups?  
One important application for leaders to learn from this research is that hiring 
cognitively diverse employees can help eliminate “groupthink” by challenging the ideas 
and perceptions of others from a values context. Often pre-employment tests are designed 
to measure the rational or “process” thinking of individuals with hiring preferences being 
given to those individuals who perform highly on these tests. In our research groups, SAT 
scores were a major factor in creating the CSU group indicating relative cognitive 
sameness, but also indications of groupthink as adding a values framework did not 
challenge their decision-making because their decision-making processes may have 
already been similar.  This study indicates diverse, even quasi-rational approaches to 
decision-making can result in more rational and ethical decision-making. Leaders should 
look for individuals with diverse values, perceptions, and decision-making processes in 
order to improve organizational decision-making and minimize groupthink. 
The results of this research are consistent with sensemaking literature that 
suggests placing stimuli into some kind of framework allows employees to better 
comprehend problems and solutions so they may take appropriate actions. In this case we 
framed and “primed” the stimuli within a values framework that helped some groups 
improve their ethical decision-making. Organizations can do the same by developing 
values statements and then challenging employees to consider company and personal 
values in their decision-making. Ancona (2012) states that sensemaking “involves 
VALUES IN MICROECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING 114 
coming up with plausible understandings and meanings; testing them with others and via, 
action; and then refining our understandings or abandoning them in favor of new ones 
that better explain a shifting reality” (p. 5). Organizational leaders might encourage 
employees to consider and share values associated with decisions to help them either 
make better ethical decisions or gain a greater level of commitment to ethical decisions 
when they are made. This form of “sensegiving” that focuses on finding opportunities to 
describe ethical decision-making in a way that appeals to the values of employees, can 
help organizations reach strategic ethics goals (Bartunek, Krim, Necochea, & 
Humphries,1999). When personal values and organizational values are brought closer 
together there is greater organizational commitment that leads to less absenteeism and 
turnover and improved job satisfaction, organizational citizenship, and job performance 
(Finegan, 2000).  
By framing decision-making in a values context, leaders in organizations may 
also be able to promote congruency with the values of the organization helping front-line 
employees understand how their personal values and actions can support the mission of 
the organization. Sensemaking theory supports this strategy as interacting with others in a 
values framework allows mental models to be tested and modified (Ancona, 2012) as we 
saw in the experiment’s ability to interrupt both unconscious values schemas and 
decision-making processes.  
As discussed in the literature review, leaders who articulate their values and 
model ethical behavior can reduce unethical behavior and interpersonal conflicts (Mayer 
et al., 2012), make ethical behaviors by subordinates a habit (Almeida, 2011), and 
positively impact the personal values of employees (Weiss, 1978). Having employees 
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working from a common “map”—in this case using values as a guide—it is easier to 
coordinate consistent ethical actions across departments (Ancona, 2012). 
 
Implications for Academicians 
 The study of economic decision-making has focused on removing value 
judgments from the discussion of economic decision-making in favor of the rational 
choice tautology. The emphasis on rational, mechanical-mathematical models was 
designed to remove the “softer” social science aspects of economic thought in order to 
bring the discipline closer to the hard sciences (Binmore, 2007; Nelson, 2003; Punam, 
2002). Yet economic decision-making is much more complex and, as this research has 
demonstrated, may be influenced by both internal and external “non-rational” factors that 
disrupt the assumption of the rational actor at least in the decision-making process. If 
values are included in economic decision-making, academicians will need to find ways to 
build layers on top of rational mechanical-mathematical models to capture these 
influences. By attempting to remove values from the decision-making process we are 
essentially disconnecting individuals from their decisions, yet individual actors can 
influence those around them. 
 The most significant implication for academicians is the need to differentiate 
between the rationality of the decision-making process and rational decisions. The study 
indicates the decision-making process can be less rational than traditional economic 
models require, yet lead to equally or better rational decisions. Traditional rational 
models require consideration of marginal cost/marginal benefit “facts” exclusively, 
however, assigning personal values to the decision considerations in this study caused the 
decision-making process to appear less rational, but often improved the rationality of 
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decisions. This appears to be especially true when a cognitively diverse group exists, as 
we would expect in the general population. In diverse populations consciously adding 
and recognizing values considerations in the economic decision-making process may lead 
to better consensus as this research found reflecting on and sharing values moved the 
groups toward more equally rational decisions in the ethical context tested here. The 
literature reviewed here suggests this value inclusive process may be more consistent 
with how most individuals actually make decisions in groups. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 
 This exploratory research provides evidence that gender, group size, and 
relationships may impact how individuals use values in their decision-making in groups 
when those values are shared. There is also evidence to support that even if the decision-
making process becomes more quasi-rational as a result of adding values to decision 
considerations, this process still results in the same or better decisions. This study was 
limited to an instrument that tests values schemas in ethical decision-making. Additional 
research could be done using other instruments to determine if the same factors impact 
other decisions. Experiments using the DIT2 that look specifically at group diversity, 
gender, group size, and relationships would also be useful in validating the results of this 
study as well as how the factors interact. For example, the research suggests females in 
small groups with close relationships might be influenced by the values of a group more 
so than when only one of the factors exists. The next step is to measure the interactions of 
these factors to determine their weights and influence. Also, while the study indicates an 
ability to disrupt values schemas in the very short-run, additional research needs to be 
done to determine whether there is a longer-term impact to the values schema disruption.  
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A qualitative approach that looks for changes in decision sets based on the values 
of individuals and the values set shared with the group would also provide additional 
insights into how shared values impact future decisions. Do participants move toward 
decision considerations that others assigned positive values to? Were they likely to give 
less weight to a decision consideration that most felt demonstrated the lack of a positive 
value?  
As this was a quasi-experimental laboratory design, additional field studies using 
a Natualistic Decision Making model (Lipshitz et al., 2001) to determine how individuals 
respond to reframing decision-making in a values framework in organizational settings as 
there is a risk that recognition priming could have led participants to match decision 
considerations with values, but not the action participants would actually take. 
 
Conclusion 
 The broad purpose of this research was to explore the role of values in economic 
decision-making as presented by Bell’s (2011b) model of values inclusive economic 
decision-making. To accomplish this a more narrow purpose was established to explore 
the role reflecting on and sharing values plays in our individual decision-making schemas 
in groups. Specifically to answer the question: Can introducing values consciously into 
decision considerations disrupt existing unconscious values schemas? 
 To accomplish this goal a quasi-experimental pretest/posttest design was 
developed using the Defining Issues 2 Test (DIT2). The DIT2 measures the unconscious 
values schemas individuals use in their decision-making that determine their level of 
ethical decision-making. Participants were not told the instrument measured ethical 
decision-making, only that it was designed to measure how they make decisions. 
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 Participants were given the DIT2 as a pretest and then asked to assign the values 
they associated with each of the decision considerations in the first scenario. Depending 
on the group, either all or random samples of 5 or 10 of the values assigned were 
anonymously shared with the group. It is important to note that they were not discussed, 
only shared and that this brief activity was the first time a values frame was introduced to 
the decision-making process. Participants were then given the DIT2 as a posttest. The 
entire process took between 1 ¼ and 1 ½ hours. Prior to running the experiments, the 
instrument and process were piloted with a class at MSC. 
 The study found several significant results. First, reframing decision-making in a 
values context made the decision process more quasi-rational for participants as a whole, 
yet led to consistent or improved decisions in the ethical context tested here. Decisions 
remained consistent in the CSU group where the group may have had more “sameness” 
going into the experiment. This suggests that sharing values reinforced, rather than 
challenged existing values schemas.  
 The MSC group both significantly improved Postconventional ethical decision-
making and moved away from lower level (personal interest) decision considerations. 
This is significant because rational, mechanical-mathematical economic models are based 
on an assumption of “self-interest”, while the study demonstrated the consideration of 
values in addition to facts moved individual and group decision-making farther away 
from pure self-interest in this instance This is consistent with both Bell’s (2011) and 
Sen’s (1994; 2004) ideas of more holistic factors beyond self-interest in economic 
decision considerations. There is evidence to suggest group diversity, gender, group size, 
and relationships may have impacted the use of values and were factors in the 
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improvements at MSC as well, but additional research is need to add validity to these 
results. The results also reflect a short-term interruption of values schemas and additional 
research is needed to determine any long-term impacts. However, Bell’s model suggests 
schemas are constantly changing so any measure at a point in time may yield different 
results based on the influences at the time.  
 These results have implications for academicians. It suggests a need to add layers 
on top of rational, mechanical-mathematical models to include values in descriptive and 
predictive economic models. For Bell’s (2011b) theory of value-inclusive economic 
decision-making it has meant adding additional factors including the external 
environment, values schemas, and social learning to provide a more complete picture of 
how values are developed, utilized in decision-making, and influenced/modified. It also 
means distinguishing between the rationality of the decision-making process and rational 
decisions as the results indicate a more quasi-rational process can still lead to more 
rational decisions. 
For businesses and managers, the study provides insight into how employees 
might use personal values to make sense of information and situations and make 
decisions at work. Bringing values to the conscious level can interrupt unconscious 
values schemas providing support for the influence of group, societal, environmental, and 
organizational values in microeconomic decision-making creating implications for 
organizations and leaders. By framing decision-making in a values context, leaders in 
organizations may also be able to promote congruency with the values of the organization 
helping front-line employees understand how their personal values and actions can 
support the mission of the organization. Sensemaking theory supports this strategy as 
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interacting with others in a values framework allows mental models to be tested and 
modified (Ancona, 2012) as we saw in the experiment’s ability to interrupt both 
unconscious values schemas and decision-making processes.  
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Appendix A 
 
Defining Issues Test-2 and Demographic Questions 
Pre-Test 
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Appendix B 
       
Defining Issues Test-2 
Post-Test 
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Appendix C 
 
Values/Anti-Values Prompts 
 
 
Freedom/Servitude 
Creativity/Uncreative 
Independent/Dependent 
Choosing own goals/Not choosing own 
goals 
Curious/Disinterested 
Self-respect/Shame 
An exciting life/An unexciting life 
A varied life/An homogeneous life 
Daring/Unadventurous 
Pleasure/Dissatisfaction 
Enjoying life/Disliking life 
Ambitious/Unambitious 
Influential/Insignificant 
Capable/Unqualified 
Successful/Unsuccessful 
Intelligent/Unintelligent 
Self-respect/Shame 
Social power/Social Weakness 
Wealth/Indebtedness 
Authority/Powerlessness 
Preserving my public image/Disregarding 
my public image 
Social recognition/Social disgrace 
National security/National insecurity 
Reciprocation of favors/Nonreciprocation of 
favors 
Family security/Family insecurity 
Sense of belonging/sense of distance 
Social order/Social disorder 
Healthy/Unhealthy 
Clean/Unclean 
Obedient/Disobedient 
Self-discipline/Unconstraint 
Politeness/Rudeness 
Honoring of parents and elders/Dishonoring 
of parents and elders 
Respect for tradition/Disrespect for tradition 
Devout/Unfaithful 
Accepting my portion in life/Not accepting 
my portion in life 
Humble/Arrogant 
Moderate/Intemperate 
A spiritual life/A nonspiritual life 
Meaning of life/No meaning of life 
Inner harmony/Inner conflict 
Detachment/Bias 
Helpful/Unhelpful 
Responsible/Irresponsible 
Forgiving/Not forgiving 
Honest/Dishonest 
Loyal/Disloyal 
Mature love/Immature love 
True friendship/False friendship 
Equality/Inequality 
Unity with nature/Disunity with nature 
Wisdom/Imprudence 
A world of beauty/A world of ugliness 
Social justice/Social injustice 
Broad-minded/Narrow-minded 
Protecting the environment/Harming the 
environment 
A world at peace/A world in disharmony
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Appendix D  
 
Values Expressed 
 
 
 
Participant number_________________ 
 
Example 
 
Imagine you  are  about  to  vote  for  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency  of 
the  United  States.  Before you  vote,  you  are  asked  to   rate  the 
importance  of  five  issues  you  could  consider  in  deciding  who  to  vote for.  
Decision Consideration       Value Expressed 
 
Financially  are  you  personally  better  off  now  than  you     _______________ 
were  four  years  ago? 
 
Does  one  candidate  have  a  superior  moral  character?   _______________ 
  
Which  candidate  stands  the  tallest?      _______________ 
 
Which  candidate  would  make  the  best  world  leader?    _______________ 
 
Which candidate has the best ideas for our country’s internal 
Problems, like crime and health care.      _______________ 
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Story 1-Famine 
 
The small village in northern India has experienced shortages of food before, but this year’s 
famine is worse than ever. Some families are even trying to feed themselves by making soup 
from tree bark. Mustaq Singh’s family is near starvation. He has heard that a rich man in his 
village has supplies of food stored away and is hording food while its price goes higher so that he 
can sell the food later at a huge profit. Mustaq is desperate and thinks about stealing some food 
from the rich man’s warehouse. The small amout of food that he needs for his family probably 
wouldn’t even be missed. 
 
Decision Consideration       Value Expressed 
 
Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough to risk getting caught for  
stealing?         _______________ 
 
Isn’t it only natural for a loving father to care so much for his family 
that he would steal?        _______________ 
 
Shouldn’t the community’s laws be upheld?     _______________ 
 
Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup from  
tree bark?         _______________ 
 
Does the rich man have any legal right to store food when other  
people are starving?        _______________ 
 
Is the motive of Mustaq Singh to steal for himself or to steal for 
his family?         _______________ 
 
What values are going to be the basis for social cooperation?  _______________ 
 
Is the epitome of eating reconcilable with the culpability of  
stealing?         _______________ 
 
Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for being so greedy?  _______________ 
 
Isn’t private property an institution to enable the rich to exploit 
the poor?         _______________ 
 
Would stealing bring about more total good for everybody concerned 
or wouldn’t it?        _______________ 
 
Are laws getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member 
of society?         _______________ 
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Appendix E 
 
Shared Values Set: Group 1 
Decision Consideration Value Expressed 
Is Mustaq Singh courageous 
enough to risk getting 
caught for stealing? 
Responsible, daring, dishonest, capable, disobedient, daring, 
disliking life, loyalty, disregarding public image, self-respect, 
courage 
Isn’t it only natural for a 
loving father to care so 
much for his family that he 
would steal? 
Responsible, health, social disorder, family security, family 
insecurity, family loyalty, devout 
Shouldn’t the community’s 
laws be upheld? 
Unhealthy, authority, disobedience, protecting the environment, 
social justice, social order, not accepting portion in life, servitude 
Does Mustaq Singh know a 
good recipe for preparing 
soup from tree bark? 
Capable, helpful, creativity, unhealthy, world of ugliness, health, 
insignificant, healthy 
Does the rich man have any 
legal right to store food 
when other people are 
starving? 
Inner conflict, equality, wealth, social injustice, detachment, disunity 
with nature, social justice, bias 
Is the motive of Mustaq 
Singh to steal for himself or 
to steal forhis family? 
Family security, forgiving, shame, irresponsible, responsible, 
reciprocation of favors, immature love, mature love, social justice 
What values are going to be 
the basis for social 
cooperation? 
Forgiving, world at peace, self-respect, social justice, responsible, 
authority, accepting my portion in life, wealth, social injustice 
Is the epitome of eating 
reconcilable with the 
culpability of stealing? 
Self respect, shame, social justice, social order, health, pleasure, 
arrogant, inner conflict, disloyal, dishonest, shame, narrow mind 
Does the rich man deserve 
to be robbed for being so 
greedy? 
Rudeness, social justice, social injustice, wealth, social order, 
dishonesty, moderate, accepting portion in life, social power 
Isn’t private property an 
institution to enable the rich 
to exploitthe poor? 
Unhelpful, not accepting one’s portion in live, social order, shame, 
wealth narrow minded, social justice, irresponsible, inequality, 
social weakness, security, equality, social injustice 
Would stealing bring about 
more total good for 
everybody concerned or 
wouldn’t it? 
Responsible, social injustice, authority, a world in disharmony, 
social weakness, independent, equality, unhelpful, sense of distance, 
inequality, helpful, social order 
Are laws getting in the way 
of the most basic claim of 
any memberof society? 
Freedom, powerlessness, social power, social justice, social 
injustice, unhelpful, meaning of life, broad minded, honest, social 
disorder 
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Shared Values Set: Group 2 
Decision Consideration Value Expressed 
Is Mustaq Singh courageous 
enough to risk getting caught 
for stealing? 
Ambitious, family security, powerlessness, social recognition, 
daring, arrogant, excepting my portion in live, loyal 
Isn’t it only natural for a 
loving father to care so 
much for his family that he 
would steal? 
Family security, responsible, devout, healthy 
Shouldn’t the community’s 
laws be upheld? 
Social justice, social order, obedient, social weakness, inequality 
Does Mustaq Singh know a 
good recipe for preparing 
soup from  
tree bark? 
Not choosing own goals, creativity, excepting portion in life, 
insignificant, helpful, capable 
Does the rich man have any 
legal right to store food 
when other  
people are starving? 
Helpful, authority, wealth, social power, unhelpful, social justice, 
equality 
Is the motive of Mustaq 
Singh to steal for himself or 
to steal for his family? 
Family security, meaning of life, self respect, responsible, inner 
conflict, detachment 
What values are going to be 
the basis for social 
cooperation? 
Social order, social justice, authority, wealth, a world at peace, 
influential, social injustice, equality 
Is the epitome of eating 
reconcilable with the 
culpability of stealing? 
Honest, wisdom, narrow minded, forgiving, unhealthy, reciprocation 
of favors, not accepting portion in life, social justice, a world of 
ugliness, responsible 
Does the rich man deserve to 
be robbed for being so 
greedy? 
Arrogance, social justice, politeness, dishonest, social injustice, 
social power, a world of ugliness, inequality 
Isn’t private property an 
institution to enable the rich 
to exploit the poor? 
Social injustice, wealth, bias, humble, equality, inequality, freedom 
Would stealing bring about 
more total good for 
everybody concerned 
or wouldn’t it? 
Social order, a world at peace, inequality, respect for tradition, a 
world in disharmony, unhelpful, helpful 
Are laws getting in the way 
of the most basic claim of 
any member of society? 
Social justice, dissatisfaction, equality, family security, obedience, 
social disorder, protect the environment, social order, choosing own 
goals 
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Shared Values Set: Group 3 
Decision Consideration Value Expressed 
Is Mustaq Singh 
courageous enough to risk 
getting caught for stealing? 
Dishonesty, family security, unintelligent, social disorder, capable 
Isn’t it only natural for a 
loving father to care so 
much for his family that he 
would steal? 
Powerlessness, shame, family security, choosing own goals, self-
respect 
Shouldn’t the community’s 
laws be upheld? 
Social justice, shame, servitude, social order, quality 
Does Mustaq Singh know a 
good recipe for preparing 
soup from  
tree bark? 
Unhelpful, insignificant, arrogant, unintelligent 
Does the rich man have any 
legal right to store food 
when other  
people are starving? 
Disloyal, wealth, successful, freedom, social power 
Is the motive of Mustaq 
Singh to steal for himself or 
to steal for his family? 
Responsible, loyal, social order, self-respect 
What values are going to be 
the basis for social 
cooperation? 
Healthy, honesty, social justice, social power 
Is the epitome of eating 
reconcilable with the 
culpability of stealing? 
Shame, influential, family security, self-respect 
Does the rich man deserve 
to be robbed for being so 
greedy? 
Social power, unclean, honesty, authority 
Isn’t private property an 
institution to enable the rich 
to exploit the poor? 
Accepting my portion in life, insignificant, broad minded, social 
order, imprudence 
Would stealing bring about 
more total good for 
everybody concerned 
or wouldn’t it? 
Unhealthy, social disgrace, social justice, social recognition 
Are laws getting in the way 
of the most basic claim of 
any member of society? 
The world in disharmony, social justice, national security, authority 
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Shared Values Set: Group 4 
Decision Consideration Value Expressed 
Is Mustaq Singh 
courageous enough to risk 
getting caught for stealing? 
Meaning of life, daring, capable, family security, health 
Isn’t it only natural for a 
loving father to care so 
much for his family that he 
would steal? 
Inner harmony, family security, authority, daring 
Shouldn’t the community’s 
laws be upheld? 
Social justice, social injustice, authority, obedient, social order 
Does Mustaq Singh know a 
good recipe for preparing 
soup from  
tree bark? 
Creativity, unhealthy, healthy, harming the environment 
Does the rich man have any 
legal right to store food 
when other  
people are starving? 
Social power, powerless, social disgrace, authority, social order 
Is the motive of Mustaq 
Singh to steal for himself or 
to steal for his family? 
Humble, sense of belonging, family security, unfaithful 
What values are going to be 
the basis for social 
cooperation? 
Equality, influential, powerlessness, social recognition 
Is the epitome of eating 
reconcilable with the 
culpability of stealing? 
Detachment, accepting portion in life, equality, social disgrace 
Does the rich man deserve 
to be robbed for being so 
greedy? 
Arrogant, indebtedness, wealth 
Isn’t private property an 
institution to enable the rich 
to exploit the poor? 
Disorder, inequality, uninitelligent 
Would stealing bring about 
more total good for 
everybody concerned 
or wouldn’t it? 
Social order, equality, a world of beauty, disobedient 
Are laws getting in the way 
of the most basic claim of 
any member of society? 
World of ugliness, obedient, enjoying life, freedom, insignificant 
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Shared Values Set: Group 5 
Decision Consideration Value Expressed 
Is Mustaq Singh 
courageous enough to risk 
getting caught for stealing? 
Family security, meaning of life, responsible 
Isn’t it only natural for a 
loving father to care so 
much for his family that he 
would steal? 
Family security, responsible 
Shouldn’t the community’s 
laws be upheld? 
Social power, equality, social order, authority, freedom 
Does Mustaq Singh know a 
good recipe for preparing 
soup from tree bark? 
Intelligent, creativity, independence 
Does the rich man have any 
legal right to store food 
when other  
people are starving? 
Intelligent, social justice, social injustice, social order, shame 
Is the motive of Mustaq 
Singh to steal for himself or 
to steal for his family? 
Family security, humble 
What values are going to be 
the basis for social 
cooperation? 
Social order, helpful, equality, social recognition 
Is the epitome of eating 
reconcilable with the 
culpability of stealing? 
Accepting portion in life, inner conflict, inner harmony, social 
injustice 
Does the rich man deserve 
to be robbed for being so 
greedy? 
Wealth, bias, social disorder, not accepting my portion in life 
Isn’t private property an 
institution to enable the rich 
to exploit the poor? 
Social order, capability, social injustice, inner conflict 
Would stealing bring about 
more total good for 
everybody concerned 
or wouldn’t it? 
Social disorder, honest, world of beauty 
Are laws getting in the way 
of the most basic claim of 
any member of society? 
Authority, inequality, freedom 
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Appendix F  
 
N2 Score Descriptive Statistics and t-Test Results by Group 
 
N2Score Pre 1 N2Score Post 1 
     
Mean 32.4707919 Mean 34.37175236 
Standard Error 3.207714234 Standard Error 3.970954016 
Median 36.66027801 Median 36.21419279 
Mode #N/A Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 10.63878455 
Standard 
Deviation 13.17016453 
Sample Variance 113.1837367 Sample Variance 173.4532337 
Kurtosis 2.377987165 Kurtosis 
-
0.393679647 
Skewness -1.478004326 Skewness 
-
0.573774133 
Range 35.39136075 Range 41.5751324 
Minimum 7.020660722 Minimum 12.0095456 
Maximum 42.41202148 Maximum 53.58467801 
Sum 357.1787109 Sum 378.089276 
Count 11 Count 11 
        
 
N2Score Pre 2 N2Score Post 2 
     
Mean 26.14421447 Mean 30.27666326 
Standard Error 3.203164508 Standard Error 3.712329955 
Median 26.69264657 Median 24.90875872 
Mode #N/A Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 14.32498717 
Standard 
Deviation 16.60204427 
Sample Variance 205.2052573 Sample Variance 275.627874 
Kurtosis -0.973004056 Kurtosis 
-
1.452984637 
Skewness 0.078509774 Skewness 0.228345857 
Range 50.39917637 Range 51.9509142 
Minimum 1.662813234 Minimum 6.446759816 
Maximum 52.06198961 Maximum 58.39767402 
Sum 522.8842893 Sum 605.5332652 
Count 20 Count 20  
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N2Score Pre 3 N2Score Post 3 
     
Mean 27.13117425 Mean 33.23663206 
Standard Error 2.806625106 Standard Error 3.120815882 
Median 27.79754756 Median 33.68428625 
Mode #N/A Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 11.57201176 
Standard 
Deviation 12.86745352 
Sample Variance 133.9114562 Sample Variance 165.5713601 
Kurtosis -1.356869269 Kurtosis 0.530728906 
Skewness 0.158825174 Skewness 0.721912097 
Range 32.5451282 Range 49.19446038 
Minimum 11.69458314 Minimum 15.08192823 
Maximum 44.23971134 Maximum 64.2763886 
Sum 461.2299622 Sum 565.0227451 
Count 17 Count 17 
        
 
     
N2Score Pre 4 N2Score Post 4 
     
Mean 28.30691515 Mean 21.52186151 
Standard Error 2.270615948 Standard Error 2.530324336 
Median 30.27532653 Median 19.99945096 
Mode #N/A Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 11.12370095 Standard Deviation 12.39600701 
Sample Variance 123.7367227 Sample Variance 153.6609899 
Kurtosis -0.488615462 Kurtosis 
-
0.872555273 
Skewness -0.108285866 Skewness 0.174020636 
Range 45.05154414 Range 44.10436412 
Minimum 5.300049497 Minimum 1.186909712 
Maximum 50.35159364 Maximum 45.29127383 
Sum 679.3659637 Sum 516.5246762 
Count 24 Count 24 
        
 
N2 Score Pre 5 N2 Score Post 5 
     
Mean 36.21427423 Mean 38.29193961 
Standard Error 2.652552161 Standard Error 2.897340967 
Median 36.88693907 Median 38.21388959 
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Mode #N/A Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 15.69271021 
Standard 
Deviation 17.14090032 
Sample Variance 246.2611538 Sample Variance 293.8104638 
Kurtosis -0.752802801 Kurtosis 
-
0.851866224 
Skewness 0.008098017 Skewness 0.09147799 
Range 61.03082413 Range 63.07693037 
Minimum 5.412950513 Minimum 9.906068215 
Maximum 66.44377464 Maximum 72.98299859 
Sum 1267.499598 Sum 1340.217886 
Count 35 Count 35 
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t-Test: Paired Two Sample for 
Means N2 Score Group 1 
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 32.4707919 34.37175236 
Variance 113.1837367 173.4532337 
Observations 11 11 
Pearson Correlation 0.805707725  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 10  
t Stat -0.808209657  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.218886928  
t Critical one-tail 1.812461123  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.437773855  
t Critical two-tail 2.228138852   
 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
N2 Score Group 2   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 26.14421447 30.27666326 
Variance 205.2052573 275.627874 
Observations 20 20 
Pearson Correlation 0.90962854  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 19  
t Stat 
-
2.662772899  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.007686697  
t Critical one-tail 1.729132812  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.015373394  
t Critical two-tail 2.093024054   
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
N2 Score Group 3   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 27.13117425 33.23663206 
Variance 133.9114562 165.5713601 
Observations 17 17 
Pearson Correlation 0.500398825  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 16  
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t Stat 
-
2.052247254  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.028440102  
t Critical one-tail 1.745883676  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.056880204  
t Critical two-tail 2.119905299   
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
N2 Score Group 4   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 28.30691515 21.52186151 
Variance 123.7367227 153.6609899 
Observations 24 24 
Pearson Correlation 0.325354866  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 23  
t Stat 2.426383951  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.011748508  
t Critical one-tail 1.713871528  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.023497015  
t Critical two-tail 2.06865761   
 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
N2 Score Group 5   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 36.21427423 38.29193961 
Variance 246.2611538 293.8104638 
Observations 35 35 
Pearson Correlation 0.881595369  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 34  
t Stat -1.5153403  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.069464435  
t Critical one-tail 1.690924255  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.13892887  
t Critical two-tail 2.032244509   
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Appendix G  
Stage 23 and 4P Descriptive Statistics and t-Tests 
Stage 23 Descriptive By Group 
 
Stage 23 Pre Group 1 Stage 23 Post Group 1 
       
Mean 28.36363636 Mean 24.36363636 
Standard Error 2.49826386 Standard Error 3.878314365 
Median 30 Median 20 
Mode 32 Mode 20 
Standard 
Deviation 8.285803851 
Standard 
Deviation 12.86291357 
Sample Variance 68.65454545 Sample Variance 165.4545455 
Kurtosis 1.059282758 Kurtosis 1.686852635 
Skewness 0.502441968 Skewness 1.253477284 
Range 30 Range 44 
Minimum 16 Minimum 10 
Maximum 46 Maximum 54 
Sum 312 Sum 268 
Count 11 Count 11 
    
 
Stage 23 Pre Group 2 Stage 23 Post Group 2 
       
Mean 27.6 Mean 27.6 
Standard Error 3.164274258 Standard Error 3.45984484 
Median 23 Median 25 
Mode 12 Mode 32 
Standard 
Deviation 14.15106468 
Standard 
Deviation 15.47289651 
Sample Variance 200.2526316 Sample Variance 239.4105263 
Kurtosis 
-
0.129339419 Kurtosis 
-
0.436354486 
Skewness 0.825606231 Skewness 0.576714106 
Range 48 Range 54 
Minimum 12 Minimum 8 
Maximum 60 Maximum 62 
Sum 552 Sum 552 
Count 20 Count 20 
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Stage 23 Pre Group 3 Stage 23 Post Group 3 
       
Mean 30.25 Mean 26.58823529 
Standard Error 3.341032774 Standard Error 3.359642426 
Median 31 Median 30 
Mode 28 Mode 10 
Standard 
Deviation 13.3641311 
Standard 
Deviation 13.85216059 
Sample Variance 178.6 Sample Variance 191.8823529 
Kurtosis 
-
1.190000107 Kurtosis 
-
1.116419022 
Skewness 
-
0.314918089 Skewness 
-
0.115266434 
Range 40 Range 44 
Minimum 10 Minimum 4 
Maximum 50 Maximum 48 
Sum 484 Sum 452 
Count 16 Count 17 
 
Stage 23 Pre Group 4 Stage 23 Post Group 4 
       
Mean 33.08333333 Mean 35.5 
Standard Error 1.937349028 Standard Error 2.470844484 
Median 34 Median 39 
Mode 34 Mode 38 
Standard 
Deviation 9.491033144 
Standard 
Deviation 12.10461644 
Sample Variance 90.07971014 Sample Variance 146.5217391 
Kurtosis 
-
0.128868487 Kurtosis -0.68507537 
Skewness 
-
0.390785004 Skewness 
-
0.588717017 
Range 36 Range 42 
Minimum 14 Minimum 12 
Maximum 50 Maximum 54 
Sum 794 Sum 852 
Count 24 Count 24 
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Stage 23 Pre Group 5 Stage 23 Pre Group 5 
       
Mean 25.25714286 Mean 24.4 
Standard Error 2.152326417 Standard Error 2.117236188 
Median 24 Median 24 
Mode 16 Mode 18 
Standard 
Deviation 12.7333348 
Standard 
Deviation 12.52573821 
Sample Variance 162.1378151 Sample Variance 156.8941176 
Kurtosis 
-
0.971649409 Kurtosis 
-
0.583931879 
Skewness 0.332948282 Skewness 0.337345415 
Range 44 Range 48 
Minimum 6 Minimum 4 
Maximum 50 Maximum 52 
Sum 884 Sum 854 
Count 35 Count 35 
 
Stage 23 Descriptive By School 
 
Stage 23 Pre MSC Stage 23 Post MSC 
       
Mean 28.625 Mean 26.5 
Standard Error 1.791584197 Standard Error 2.035587635 
Median 28 Median 26 
Mode 32 Mode 32 
Standard 
Deviation 12.41245942 
Standard 
Deviation 14.10296483 
Sample Variance 154.0691489 Sample Variance 198.893617 
Kurtosis 
-
0.482283949 Kurtosis 
-
0.503608453 
Skewness 0.386954188 Skewness 0.468350003 
Range 50 Range 58 
Minimum 10 Minimum 4 
Maximum 60 Maximum 62 
Sum 1374 Sum 1272 
Count 48 Count 48 
Stage 23 Descriptive All Data 
 
Stage 23 Pre All Data Stage 23 PostAll Data 
       
Mean 28.52336449 Mean 27.8317757 
Standard Error 1.17648639 Standard Error 1.326618413 
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Median 28 Median 26 
Mode 32 Mode 8 
Standard 
Deviation 12.16966984 
Standard 
Deviation 13.72264757 
Sample Variance 148.100864 Sample Variance 188.3110563 
Kurtosis -0.7652174 Kurtosis 
-
0.883736879 
Skewness 0.138215681 Skewness 0.19703414 
Range 54 Range 58 
Minimum 6 Minimum 4 
Maximum 60 Maximum 62 
Sum 3052 Sum 2978 
Count 107 Count 107 
 
Stage 23 t-Test By Group 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
Stage 23 Group 1   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 28.36363636 24.36363636 
Variance 68.65454545 165.4545455 
Observations 11 11 
Pearson Correlation 0.831815499  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 10  
t Stat 1.760281668  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.05442699  
t Critical one-tail 1.812461123  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.10885398  
t Critical two-tail 2.228138852   
 
 
 
 
 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
Stage 23 Group 2   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 27.6 27.6 
Variance 200.2526316 239.4105263 
Observations 20 20 
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Pearson Correlation 0.845343725  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 19  
t Stat 4.76546E-17  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.5  
t Critical one-tail 1.729132812  
P(T<=t) two-tail 1  
t Critical two-tail 2.093024054   
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
Stage 23 Group 3   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 30 26.58823529 
Variance 168.5 191.8823529 
Observations 17 17 
Pearson Correlation 0.695172434  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 16  
t Stat 1.338917165  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.099655534  
t Critical one-tail 1.745883676  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.199311069  
t Critical two-tail 2.119905299   
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
Stage 23 Group 4   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 33.08333333 35.5 
Variance 90.07971014 146.5217391 
Observations 24 24 
Pearson Correlation 0.321303408  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 23  
t Stat 
-
0.927957396  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.181533137  
t Critical one-tail 1.713871528  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.363066274  
t Critical two-tail 2.06865761   
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t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
Stage 23 Group 5   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 25.25714286 24.4 
Variance 162.1378151 156.8941176 
Observations 35 35 
Pearson Correlation 0.841334993  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 34  
t Stat 0.712482319  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.240513679  
t Critical one-tail 1.690924255  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.481027358  
t Critical two-tail 2.032244509   
 
Stage 23 t-Test By School 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
Stage 23 MSC   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 28.625 26.5 
Variance 154.0691489 198.893617 
Observations 48 48 
Pearson Correlation 0.776545246  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 47  
t Stat 1.634913438  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.054374096  
t Critical one-tail 1.677926722  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.108748192  
t Critical two-tail 2.011740514   
 
 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
Stage 23 CSU   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 28.44067797 28.91525424 
Variance 145.8024547 180.3202805 
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Observations 59 59 
Pearson Correlation 0.706922165  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 58  
t Stat 
-
0.370363041  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.35623057  
t Critical one-tail 1.671552762  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.712461139  
t Critical two-tail 2.001717484   
 
Stage 23 t-Test All Data 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
Stage 23 All Data   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 28.52336449 27.8317757 
Variance 148.100864 188.3110563 
Observations 107 107 
Pearson Correlation 0.735815926  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 106  
t Stat 0.751376624  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.227045501  
t Critical one-tail 1.659356034  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.454091002  
t Critical two-tail 1.982597262   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4P Descriptive By Group 
 
4P Pre Group 1 4P Post Group 1 
       
Mean 34.72727273 Mean 35.63636364 
Standard Error 3.294874557 Standard Error 4.559251787 
Median 32 Median 32 
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Mode 32 Mode 32 
Standard 
Deviation 10.92786264 
Standard 
Deviation 15.1213275 
Sample Variance 119.4181818 Sample Variance 228.6545455 
Kurtosis 0.230159095 Kurtosis -0.9986119 
Skewness 0.99486071 Skewness 0.155499382 
Range 34 Range 46 
Minimum 22 Minimum 14 
Maximum 56 Maximum 60 
Sum 382 Sum 392 
Count 11 Count 11 
 
4P Pre Group 2 4P Post Group 2 
       
Mean 32.9 Mean 34.4 
Standard Error 3.200246701 Standard Error 2.693461869 
Median 36 Median 37 
Mode 40 Mode 40 
Standard 
Deviation 14.31193834 
Standard 
Deviation 12.04552767 
Sample Variance 204.8315789 Sample Variance 145.0947368 
Kurtosis 
-
0.129645373 Kurtosis 
-
0.751960456 
Skewness 
-
0.447850824 Skewness 
-
0.373060661 
Range 52 Range 40 
Minimum 4 Minimum 12 
Maximum 56 Maximum 52 
Sum 658 Sum 688 
Count 20 Count 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4P Pre Group 3 4P Post Group 3 
       
Mean 36.11764706 Mean 36 
Standard Error 4.106918797 Standard Error 3.910769444 
Median 38 Median 32 
Mode 42 Mode 40 
Standard 16.93326 Standard 16.1245155 
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Deviation Deviation 
Sample Variance 286.7352941 Sample Variance 260 
Kurtosis 0.047674091 Kurtosis 0.953722739 
Skewness 0.46247221 Skewness 1.098900043 
Range 64 Range 60 
Minimum 10 Minimum 16 
Maximum 74 Maximum 76 
Sum 614 Sum 612 
Count 17 Count 17 
 
4P Pre Group 4 4P Post Group 4 
       
Mean 32.16666667 Mean 35.25 
Standard Error 2.68359662 Standard Error 2.553237502 
Median 32 Median 38 
Mode 32 Mode 38 
Standard 
Deviation 13.14688479 
Standard 
Deviation 12.50825814 
Sample Variance 172.8405797 Sample Variance 156.4565217 
Kurtosis 
-
0.290422452 Kurtosis 
-
0.376249665 
Skewness 0.049015264 Skewness 0.087705898 
Range 52 Range 48 
Minimum 4 Minimum 14 
Maximum 56 Maximum 62 
Sum 772 Sum 846 
Count 24 Count 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4P Pre Group 5 4P Pre Group 5 
       
Mean 30.45714286 Mean 30.05714286 
Standard Error 2.257515127 Standard Error 2.502416599 
Median 30 Median 28 
Mode 18 Mode 20 
Standard 13.3556396 Standard 14.80449625 
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Deviation Deviation 
Sample Variance 178.3731092 Sample Variance 219.1731092 
Kurtosis 
-
0.723399491 Kurtosis 
-
0.028662321 
Skewness 0.554350578 Skewness 0.546164043 
Range 50 Range 64 
Minimum 12 Minimum 2 
Maximum 62 Maximum 66 
Sum 1066 Sum 1052 
Count 35 Count 35 
 
4P Descriptive By School 
 
4P Pre MSC 4P Post MSC 
       
Mean 34.45833333 Mean 35.25 
Standard Error 2.081018217 Standard Error 2.022589626 
Median 34 Median 34 
Mode 32 Mode 40 
Standard 
Deviation 14.41771713 
Standard 
Deviation 14.01291198 
Sample Variance 207.8705674 Sample Variance 196.3617021 
Kurtosis 0.246005245 Kurtosis 0.188115249 
Skewness 0.188766611 Skewness 0.510466575 
Range 70 Range 64 
Minimum 4 Minimum 12 
Maximum 74 Maximum 76 
Sum 1654 Sum 1692 
Count 48 Count 48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4P Pre 4 CSU 4P Post 4 CSU 
       
Mean 31.15254237 Mean 32.16949153 
Standard Error 1.716426902 Standard Error 1.827952412 
Median 30 Median 34 
Mode 18 Mode 38 
Standard 13.1841252 Standard 14.04076889 
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Deviation Deviation 
Sample Variance 173.8211572 Sample Variance 197.1431911 
Kurtosis -0.68131744 Kurtosis 
-
0.330805324 
Skewness 0.343731487 Skewness 0.301949685 
Range 58 Range 64 
Minimum 4 Minimum 2 
Maximum 62 Maximum 66 
Sum 1838 Sum 1898 
Count 59 Count 59 
 
 
4P Descriptive All Data 
 
4P Pre All Data 4P Post All Data 
        
Mean 32.63551402 Mean 33.55140187 
Standard Error 1.33258026 Standard Error 1.357933749 
Median 32 Median 34 
Mode 22 Mode 38 
Standard 
Deviation 13.7843174 
Standard 
Deviation 14.04657592 
Sample Variance 190.0074061 Sample Variance 197.3062952 
Kurtosis 
-
0.229249449 Kurtosis 
-
0.106262599 
Skewness 0.287380517 Skewness 0.380887114 
Range 70 Range 74 
Minimum 4 Minimum 2 
Maximum 74 Maximum 76 
Sum 3492 Sum 3590 
Count 107 Count 107 
 
 
 
 
 
4P t-Test By Group 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
4P Group 1   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 34.72727273 35.63636364 
Variance 119.4181818 228.6545455 
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Observations 11 11 
Pearson Correlation 0.778794224  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 10  
t Stat 
-
0.316607924  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.379025732  
t Critical one-tail 1.812461123  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.758051465  
t Critical two-tail 2.228138852   
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
4P Group 2   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 32.9 34.4 
Variance 204.8315789 145.0947368 
Observations 20 20 
Pearson Correlation 0.844084322  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 19  
t Stat 
-
0.874113875  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.196485577  
t Critical one-tail 1.729132812  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.392971154  
t Critical two-tail 2.093024054   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
4P Group 3   
  Variable 1 
Variable 
2 
Mean 36.11764706 36 
Variance 286.7352941 260 
Observations 17 17 
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Pearson Correlation 0.783766186  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 16  
t Stat 0.044515947  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.482521995  
t Critical one-tail 1.745883676  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.96504399  
t Critical two-tail 2.119905299   
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
4P Group 4   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 32.16666667 35.25 
Variance 172.8405797 156.4565217 
Observations 24 24 
Pearson Correlation 0.643800689  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 23  
t Stat 
-
1.393156989  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.088446019  
t Critical one-tail 1.713871528  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.176892038  
t Critical two-tail 2.06865761   
 
 
 
 
 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
4P Group 5   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 30.45714286 30.05714286 
Variance 178.3731092 219.1731092 
Observations 35 35 
Pearson Correlation 0.791224536  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 34  
t Stat 0.257192263  
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P(T<=t) one-tail 0.399290258  
t Critical one-tail 1.690924255  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.798580517  
t Critical two-tail 2.032244509   
 
4P t-Test By School 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
4P MSC   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 34.45833333 35.25 
Variance 207.8705674 196.3617021 
Observations 48 48 
Pearson Correlation 0.792419025  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 47  
t Stat 
-
0.598298536  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.276256622  
t Critical one-tail 1.677926722  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.552513245  
t Critical two-tail 2.011740514   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
4P CSU   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 31.15254237 32.16949153 
Variance 173.8211572 197.1431911 
Observations 59 59 
Pearson Correlation 0.733976524  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 58  
t Stat -  
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0.784182628 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.218061989  
t Critical one-tail 1.671552762  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.436123978  
t Critical two-tail 2.001717484   
 
4P t-Test All Data 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
4P All Data   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 32.63551402 33.55140187 
Variance 190.0074061 197.3062952 
Observations 107 107 
Pearson Correlation 0.76371659  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 106  
t Stat 
-
0.990060057  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.162199702  
t Critical one-tail 1.659356034  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.324399403  
t Critical two-tail 1.982597262   
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Appendix H 
 
George Fox University Human Subjects Committee Approval 
 
 
From: BeckyJensen<rjensen@georgefox.edu> Subject: HSRC Approval 
Date: April 2, 2013 4:31:36 PM AKDT   
To: "HollyBell(me.com)"<hollybell@me.com> 
Cc: Paul Shelton <pshelton@georgefox.edu> 
 
Hi Holly, 
I have good news for you! I just received word that your HSRC has been approved! The form couldn't be sent today 
because of computer problems, but someone from that committee gave me a call to let me know it had been 
approved and you could move on with your research. 
I apologize for the length of time you've had to wait, but at least now it's done. I will send you the form with the 
approval signatures as soon as I receive it. 
-- 
Becky Jensen  
Administrative Assistant  
GFU School of Business  
503-554-2821 
 
